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American state parentage laws have traditionally required biological or 
adoptive ties and no more than two parents for any one child at any one 
time.1  Biological ties were demonstrated by giving birth or by evidence that 
one’s sperm prompted a birth from consensual sex.2  Adoptive ties were 
 
* Professor Emeritus, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.A. Colby College; J.D., The 
University of Chicago.  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Fourth Loyola University of 
Chicago Constitutional Law Colloquium on November 2, 2013.  Thanks to Robin Babcox-Poole and 
Jenna Ewing for their superb assistance.  All errors are mine. 
 1. Julie Shapiro, De Facto Parents and the Unfulfilled Promise of the New ALI Principles, 35 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 769, 771 (1999); see Debra E. Guston & William S. Singer, The State of Gay and 
Lesbian Adoption in New Jersey, 239-APR N.J. LAW. 35, 37-38 (2006). 
 2. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the 
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 883, 902 (2000). 
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established by completion of formal procedures by those desiring to parent, 
where prospective adopters were assessed for parental worthiness by the 
state; therein the parental interests of any existing parents were seriously 
respected, often by affording them veto powers.3  While the two parent 
policy largely continues,4 second parents with no biological or formal 
adoptive ties and with no rights under a valid child creation pact predating 
birth (as with assisted reproduction, with or without a surrogate) are 
increasingly recognized for children (long after birth) with only one parent.5  
At times, a woman or a man becomes a second parent under law, along with 
the birth mother, because natural ties are presumed, though sometimes 
impossible, as when a second woman holds out a child as her own.  Other 
times, a man or a woman becomes a second parent via an informal adoption, 
as in de facto parenthood, where there is no state assessment; little respect 
for the actual wishes of the existing parent about second parenthood; and, at 
best, notice to the state only after the fact. 
 
 3. Veto powers were usually denied, however, to unwed biological fathers who had not seized 
their constitutionally-protected parental opportunity interests in a timely fashion under state adoption 
laws, thus never achieving superior parental rights.  Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267 (1983); see, 
e.g., In re Baby Girl S., 407 S.W.3d 904, 918 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013) (in some states, maternal 
concealment of pregnancy will not excuse unwed biological father from seizing paternity interest in a 
timely fashion). 
 4. But see, e.g., Smith v. Cole, 553 So.2d 847, 854 (La. 1989) and T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So.2d 
873, 877 (La. 1999) (via common lawmaking, court recognizes that three different parents of a child 
born of sex (a husband, the natural father, and a wife/birth mother) may all childrear per court order); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c)(1) (West 2013) (de facto parent “has had the support and consent of 
the child’s parent or parents who fostered the formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship 
between the child and de facto parent”), though found unconstitutional if applied to establish three 
parents, Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 731 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010); and McAllister v. McAllister, 779 
N.W.2d 652, 662 (N.D. 2010) (birth mother granted “decisionmaking responsibility and primary 
residential responsibility,” while former stepfather (as psychological parent) and biological father each 
granted visitation).  A third parent can also be granted at least visitation, if not custodial, interests where 
the two designated legal parents do not object.  See, e.g., In re Parentage of J.W., 2013 IL 114817 ¶ 53 
(determining best interests, not serious endangerment, standard governed visitation request by biological 
father where birth mother had custody and voluntary parentage acknowledgement father had visitation 
rights and child support obligations).  The prospect of three parents with statutory childcare standing, as 
proposed in California in 2012, was criticized in Elizabeth A. Pfenson, Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen?: 
The Potential Concerns of Finding More Parents and Fewer Legal Strangers in California’s Recently-
Proposed Multiple-Parents Bill, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2023, 2050-2058 (2013).  Yet in 2013, 
California recognized such possible standing, CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(d) (West 2014), as well as third 
parent child support duties, CAL. FAM. CODE § 4057(b)(5)(D) (West 2014).  On when three (or more?) 
parents might be recognized see CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2014) (“court may find . . . more than 
two persons with a claim to parentage . . . if . . . recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to 
the child”).  When there are initially three parents in California, and no detriment to the child if there are 
only two parents, the court is required to select just two parents based on the “weightier considerations 
of policy and logic.”  See, e.g., In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 876-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) 
(employing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (West 2014)). 
 5. See, e.g., Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 545-46 (Kan. 2013) (enforcement of prebirth 
coparenting agreement between unwed birth mother, who employed assisted reproduction methods, and 
her same sex partner). 
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Where a child has one biological or adoptive parent, the recognition of a 
second parent with no biological, formal adoptive, or child creation pact 
ties, but with standing to seek childcare,6 necessarily impacts the childcare 
prerogatives of the existing parent.  As these prerogatives are 
constitutionally protected, the second parent cannot be state-recognized over 
the biological/adoptive/assisted reproduction parent’s objection without a 
showing going beyond the child’s best interests.7  First, parent constraints 
on second parent designations are guided by the “superior rights” doctrine.8  
The federal constitutional demands of this doctrine are unclear, however, 
given the split opinions of the United States Supreme Court in Troxel v. 
Granville.9 
As recognitions of childcare interests for second parents necessarily 
impact existing parents’ constitutional interests “in the care, custody and 
control of their children,” what standards should guide?  Should the 
standards follow the principles on losses of other constitutional interests?  If 
so, which interests, since the standards vary between interests?  Further, 
should the standards on second parent childcare vary depending upon 
whether the child was born of sex to the existing parent, of assisted 
reproduction to the existing parent, or of assisted reproduction to a surrogate 
who is not the existing parent? 
Where a child has one biological, adoptive, or assisted reproduction 
parent, the recognition of a second parent, with no biological or formal 
adoptive ties and with no child creation pacts who can be subject to a child 
support order, implicates the federal constitutional interests of the second 
parent.  These interests include both procedural protections, including notice 
and hearing before any second parent designation, and substantive 
protections, including at least a rational public policy.  
What standards should guide child support orders against newly-
designated second parents?  As to process, the often-utilized three factor 
balancing test for federal procedural due process clearly operates.10  
 
 6. Childcare orders herein include, but are not limited to, orders regarding custody, visitation, 
and allocation of parental responsibilities.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-123(1) (West 2012) 
(“allocation of parental responsibilities”) and COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124(1.5) (West 2013) 
(“allocation of parental responsibilities” includes “parenting time and decision-making responsibilities”) 
and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29 (2002) (custody and visitation orders). 
 7. Lawrence Schlam, Children “Not in the Physical Custody of One of Their Parents”: The 
Superior Rights Doctrine and Third-Party Standing Under the Uniform Marriage and Dissolution of 
Marriage Act, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 405, 406-07 (2000).  
 8. Id.  
 9.  530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 10. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339-49 (1976) (before governments decide to deprive an 
individual of life, liberty, or property, they must weigh private interests affected by any governmental 
action; the governmental interest, including the burdens on government in providing greater process; and 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation without additional process and the availability of a substitute process 
that would reduce the risk).  See, e.g., Jarmon v. Comm’r of Soc. Serv., 807 A.2d 1109, 1114, 1117 
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Substantively, the imposition of child support obligations will be 
fundamentally unfair when the second parent does not have, or should not 
reasonably have, some level of understanding of a possible later financial 
obligation.11 
After reviewing the uncertainties under Troxel, this paper will examine 
current American second parent laws on childcare and child support.  As to 
each there are significant variations.12  The paper will conclude by exploring 
the federal constitutional constraints on second parent childcare and child 
support.13 
 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2002) (no additional predeprivation process is due when statute allows seizure via a 
lien of property of a parent “with an arrearage of court-ordered support”). 
 11. Consider, e.g., a new second parent whose support status only became possible long after 
he/she established a relationship with the child, as when an existing, but absent, parent dies during the 
new second parent’s relationship with the child’s other parent and with the child. 
 12. The paper will chiefly focus on second parent laws outside of parental designations prebirth 
and at birth when assisted reproductive technologies (ART) are employed, with or without surrogates. 
 13. The paper will not examine current American nonparent childcare and child support laws 
where there are also significant variations as well as federal constitutional constraints.  Nonparent laws, 
as with second parent laws, prompt both superior parental rights and due process issues.  Admittedly, it 
is difficult sometimes to distinguish between second parent and nonparent laws if one looks beyond 
labels to effects.  See, e.g., In re S.H., 71 A.3d 973, 974 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (“permanent legal 
custody” award regarding children to maternal grandmother over natural father’s objection did not 
foreclose father’s later petition for primary custody as it did not terminate natural father’s superior 
parental rights) and Philbrook v. Theriault, 957 A.2d 74, 79 (Me. 2008) (grandparent can be designated 
de facto parent and awarded custody over natural parent’s objection where grandparent, while applicable 
“only in limited circumstances,” undertook “a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible 
parental role in the child’s life” with the understanding and acceptance of any existing parent).  While 
similar issues arise regarding nonparents and second parents, there are also significant differences 
suggesting separate treatment is needed; differences include legal failures to place nonparents on equal 
footing with second parents in either childcare or support settings.  See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/607 (West 2013) and 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602.1(b) (West 2010) (grandparent may only seek 
visitation while a parent may seek joint custody in a marriage dissolution proceeding). 
  The paper will also not examine current American parentage laws extending beyond 
biological and adoptive parents in settings beyond childcare and child support.  See, e.g., McManus v. 
Hinney, 143 N.W.2d 1, 1-2 (Wis. 1966) (issue as to whether stepparent was subject to parental immunity 
doctrine [since abolished] when sued by stepchildren for injuries in car accident, and thus whether 
stepparent’s insurer could be liable; remand for hearing on whether stepparent stood in loco parentis); In 
re Turer’s Estate, 133 N.W.2d 765, 765 (Wis. 1965) (issue as to whether stepparent could recover from 
his wife’s estate the past due child support owed by the wife’s former husband; majority found 
stepparent could recover as otherwise there would be an unjust enrichment of the estate); and In re 
Brianna M., 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 665, 688 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (issue as to whether rebuttal of paternity 
presumption operates comparably in paternity and dependency settings; court finds only in dependency 
is “presumed fatherhood . . . a function of a man’s commitment to parental responsibilities, not his 
biology”). 
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II.  UNCERTAIN BOUNDARIES ON SECOND PARENT CHILDCARE AND CHILD 
SUPPORT ORDERS 
A.  Childcare Boundaries 
In Troxel in 2000, four United States Supreme Court justices 
determined that “the liberty interest . . . of parents in the care, custody, and 
control of their children” (herein childcare interests) generally forecloses 
states from compelling grandparent childcare over parental objections.14  
States typically advance these liberty interests via a superior rights 
doctrine.15  Yet these four justices recognized in Troxel that “special 
factors” might justify a state allowing judicial override of parental 
objections as long as a parent’s contrary wishes on childcare were accorded 
“at least some special weight.”16  The plurality, and one concurring justice, 
reserved the question of whether any “nonparental” childcare must “include 
a showing of harm or potential harm to the child” without such childcare.17  
The concurring justice did hint, however, that at least some nonparental 
childcare could be based solely on a preexisting “substantial relationship” 
between a child and a nonparent and “the State’s particular best interests 
standard.”18 
A dissenter observed, not unlike the concurrer, that a best interest 
standard might be constitutional where the nonparent acted “in a caregiving 
role over a significant period of time,”19 hinting that such a nonparent might 
 
 14. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Ginsburg and Breyer [hereinafter plurality opinion]) (“Perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty 
interests recognized by this Court.”); id. at 68-69 (“So long as a parent adequately cares for his or her 
children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of 
the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing 
of that parent’s children.”). 
 15. Sacha M. Coupet, “Ain’t I A Parent?”: The Exclusion of Kinship Caregivers From the 
Debate Over Expansions of Parenthood, 34 NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 595, 615-18 (2010).  
 16. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70 (plurality opinion) (“If a fit parent’s decision of the kind at issue here 
becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent’s 
own determination”). 
 17. Id. at 73 (plurality opinion) 
We do not consider . . . whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation 
statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent 
to granting [nonparent] visitation.”); id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring) (“There is no need to 
decide whether harm is required. 
Id. 
 18. Id. at 76-78 (Souter, J., concurring) (while not every nonparent should be capable of securing 
visitation upon demonstrating a child’s best interests, perhaps a nonparent who establishes “that he or 
she has a substantial relationship with the child” should be able to petition if the state chooses). 
 19. Id. at 98-99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)  
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even be afforded “de facto” parent status.20  A second dissenter noted the 
possibilities for both “gradations” of nonparents and carefully crafted 
definitions of parents.21  He believed new laws generally should originate in 
the states, preferably “in legislative chambers or in electoral campaigns” 
and not in courts, as this would be “entirely compatible with the 
commitment to representative democracy.”22  A third dissenter added that 
because at least some children in nonparent childcare settings likely “have 
fundamental liberty interests” in “preserving established familial or family-
like bonds,”23 nonparents seeking childcare orders must be distinguished by 
whether there is a “presence or absence of some embodiment of family.”24 
 
Cases are sure to arise . . . in which a third party, by acting in a caregiving role over a 
significant period of time, has developed a relationship with a child which is not necessarily 
subject to absolute parental veto. . . . In the design and elaboration of their visitation laws, 
States may be entitled to consider that certain relationships are such that to avoid the risk of 
harm, a best interests standard can be employed by their domestic relations courts in some 
circumstances. 
Id. 
 20. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 100-01 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“A fit parent’s right vis-à-vis a 
complete stranger is one thing; her right vis-à-vis another parent or a de facto parent may be another.”). 
 21. Id. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Judicial vindications of ‘parental rights’ . . . requires . . . 
judicially defined gradations of other persons (grandparents, extended family, adoptive family in an 
adoption later found to be invalid, long-term guardians, etc.) who may have some claim against the 
wishes of the parents.”).  Gradations of parents are suggested in AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.03 (2002) (recognizing a legal parent, a parent by estoppel, and a de 
facto parent). 
 22. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91-93 (expressing no desire for a “new regime of judicially prescribed, 
and federally prescribed, family law”).  A more limited view of the need for legislative deference finds 
common law precedents on nonparent and new parent childcare are unavailable when statutes already 
significantly address such childcare, though particular litigants are not included in the statutory scheme.  
See, e.g., In re Custody of B.M.H., 315 P.3d 470, 488 (Wash. 2013) (Wiggins, J., dissenting in part). 
 23. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 
110, 130 (1989) (the Court has not “had occasion to decide whether a child has a liberty interest, 
symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial relationship”) and In re Meridian H., 798 
N.W.2d 96, 99, 107 (Neb. 2011) (no recognition of a federal or state constitutional right to continuing 
sibling relationships with a sister upon the termination of parental rights regarding the sister, where the 
sister was placed in foster care and the two older siblings were adopted).  James G. Dwyer advocates for 
such interests for children, in either a continuing parent-child or parental-like relationship or a 
continuing sibling or sibling-like relationship.  See JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF 
CHILDREN 4 (Cambridge University Press 2006).  The book develops  
a general theory of what children are morally entitled to as against the state, and correlatively 
what moral duties the state owes to children, when the state takes it upon itself to make 
authoritative decisions about the legal family relationships children will have and about 
which of a child’s social relationships will receive legal protection.  
See id.  See also James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Self-Determination and Children’s Custody: A New 
Analytical Framework for State Structuring of Children’s Family Life, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 79 (2012). And 
see Jill Elaine Hasday, Siblings in Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 897, 930 (2012).  
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After Troxel, important federal constitutional questions remain 
concerning the limits not only on court-compelled grandparent (and other 
nonparent25) childcare orders,26 but also on second parent designations 
unrelated to biology, formal adoption or assisted reproduction pacts.27  
Some justices in Troxel, recognized that states might afford second parent 
status, rather than nonparent childcare standing, to grandparents and to 
others who earlier childcared without court order.28  The constitutional 
questions are particularly challenging when second parent status was never 
actually contemplated by first parents, as when single parents only thought 
that their then live-in companions (usually in intimate relationships) were 
doing “chores” that aided children in the household.29 
B.  Child Support Boundaries 
Because second parent designations often yield not only childcare 
opportunities, but also child support responsibilities,30 important federal 
constitutional questions also arise regarding the limits on child support 
orders against newly-designated second parents.31  Such orders are 
 
Lastly, states should consider whether full or half-siblings separated by divorce, the end of a 
nonmarital relationship, or a parent’s death will have an enforceable right to contact, 
communication, and visitation, unless a court determines that such connection would be 
contrary to the best interests of one or more siblings.  Such a right would protect and promote 
sibling relationships, albeit at the cost of some infringement on parental prerogatives.  In light 
of the constitutional constraints that Troxel appears to impose, states that decide to create 
such an enforceable right to sibling visitation might specify that courts will give ‘material 
weight’ or more to parent’s assessment of her child’s best interests.   
See also Frazier, 295 P.3d at 557 (denying children opportunities to have two parents and to continue to 
be reared by a heretofore nonparent under law, “impinges upon the children’s constitutional rights”). 
 24. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 25. See, e.g., In re A.M.K., 351 Wis.2d 223, at ¶19 (assumes, as do parties, that Troxel 
grandparent guidelines apply to other nonparents seeking childcare, like former same sex parents). 
 26. Of course, beyond federal constitutional constraints there can be independent state 
constitutional constraints more protective of parental authority.  See, e.g., Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.3d 
573, 582 (Tenn. 1993) (state constitutional right to privacy protects parental caretaking as long as 
parents’ “decisions do not substantially endanger the welfare of their children”). 
 27. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73 (plurality opinion).  
 28. Id. at 85.  
 29. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Limiting the Prerogatives of Legal Parents: Judicial Skepticism of 
the American Law Institute’s Treatment of De Facto Parents, 25 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 477, 486-
88 (2013). There are also additional questions involving certain alleged second parents, especially one-
time stepparents.  See, e.g., B.M.H., 315 P.3d at 483 (“satisfying the consent [to de facto parent status] 
prong is meaningless in the stepparent context.  Consent to coparent within the marriage and family unit 
is not the same as consent  to a life-long, parent-child relationship on the part of the stepparent to 
continue no matter what happens to the marriage”) (Madsen, C.J., concurring/dissenting). 
 30. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (West 2013) (de facto parenthood, once 
established, places parent in same position as, e.g., birth mother and parent via formal adoption). 
 31. Mark A. Momjian, Cause of Action Against Former Domestic Partner to Pay Child 
Support¸23 CAUSES OF ACTION 2d 1, §3 (2003). 
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particularly troublesome when unaccompanied by any second parent 
standing for childcare.  And such orders are troublesome when a second 
parent obliged to support never actually contemplated that earlier acts could 
ever lead to support duties, especially after the second parent no longer 
lived with, or was otherwise connected to, the first parent or child. 
Yet child support orders have never required those obliged to pay to 
have future childcare opportunities or to have had parent-child intentions.32  
Thus, failed condoms, maternal deceit about female birth control, and 
mistakes about male sterility have never excused natural fathers from child 
support duties for their children born of sex.  Some financially obligated 
men have never had and will never have childcare opportunities.  This 
occurs with men who sire children from sexual assaults33 and men whose 
parental rights were terminated shortly after birth.34  Some financially 
obligated men had, but lost, childcare opportunities with little or no fault on 
their part because they failed as unwed fathers to step up to their parental 
responsibilities in a timely fashion.35  Similarly, nonadopting stepparents at 
times have child support duties arising solely from their marriage to (or 
other state-recognized marriage-like relationship36 with) a parent—who 
unlike some childcare opportunity settings—need not be a single parent.37  
 
 32. See, e.g., In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144, 152 (Ill. 2003) (“an unmarried man who 
biologically causes conception through sexual relations without the premeditated intent of birth is legally 
obligated to support a child”) and Danelz v. Gayden, 2013 WL 1190818 at 1, 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) 
(adult child can sue biological father for child support arrearages though mother’s husband raised and 
supported the child; biological father’s argument that “there is inherent inequity in requiring him to pay . 
. . when he was not notified that he might be Jordan’s father and was deprived of . . . [an] opportunity to 
establish a relationship with the child” is only relevant to the amount of support that may be ordered). 
 33. See, e.g., Pena v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 895, 899 (7th Cir. 1996) (male statutory rapist has “no 
constitutionally protected interest in the offspring of his relationship,” even though it was consensual – a 
19-year-old male and a 15-year-old female who placed the child for adoption); Christian Child 
Placement Service v. Vestal, 962 P.2d 1261, 1266 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (criminal intercourse means 
biological father has no voice in adoption proceeding); and Phillip E.K., Jr. v. Sky M.L., 936 N.Y.S.2d 
859, 861, 865 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2011) (no protected parental interest for 19 year-old male who 
impregnated a 14-year-old female if child’s best interests would not be served). 
 34. Not all states, however, allow for a continuing child support obligation after a parental rights 
termination.  See, e.g., In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 745 n.4 (Iowa 2011) (illustrating how some states 
continue support duties) and In re C.N., 839 N.W.2d 841, 843 (N.D. 2013) (continued child support after 
parental rights ended for incarcerated father). 
 35. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267-68 (need for unwed biological father to seize paternity 
opportunity interest in a proper and timely fashion or the state can deny childcare standing to the father 
in the child’s adoption case); In re Adoption of Baby Girl H., 635 N.W.2d 256, 263-64 (Neb. 2001) 
(father failed to challenge proposed adoption properly as his attorney filed a timely lawsuit, but in the 
wrong court); Heidbreder v. Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355, 361 (Minn. 2002) (similar to Baby Girl H. as 
biological father had no standing to contest adoption due, in large part, to his attorney’s errors); and 
Baby Girl S., 407 S.W.3d at 910 (maternal concealment of pregnancy does not excuse unwed biological 
father from timely seizing the Lehr paternity opportunity interest). 
 36. Other state-recognized marriage-like relationships, wherein there may also be stepparents, 
include domestic partnerships and civil unions. 
 37. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 108.045(1) (West 2005) (“expenses of the family and the 
education” of stepchildren are “chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife”).  Compare 
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Thus, there can easily be three parents for support purposes though there 
may be only two parents for childcare purposes. 
III. STATE SECOND PARENT CHILDCARE AND CHILD SUPPORT LAWS 
A.  Childcare Interests of Second Parents 
While important, parental objections to nonparental childcare after 
Troxel are not always dispositive.38  Since Troxel, the United States 
Supreme Court has said little about nonparent childcare, including the 
“special factors” that may override the “special weight” accorded parental 
wishes; de facto parents; children’s’ fundamental liberty interests; or 
family-like bonds.39  While some state legislatures have extensively refined 
their grandparent childcare standing laws,40 many have not addressed 
comprehensively the childcare interests of other nonparents, or the 
children’s interests in preserving family-like bonds with nonparents, as via 
“gradations” of nonparents, when there is single parent objection.41 
But since Troxel, many state lawmakers have addressed the childcare 
opportunities of newly-designated second parents, be they grandparents or 
others.42  State lawmakers have determined the import of a “caregiving role 
 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 501(b) (West 1995) (“Where the parents are unable to provide a minor child’s 
minimum needs, a stepparent . . . shall be under a duty to provide those needs”). 
 38. Whatever Troxel demands on respecting parental objections to nonparental childcare, state 
laws can be more demanding as long as nonparents and their alleged children themselves have no federal 
law interests in second parent designations. 
 39. One distinguished commentator said about Troxel: 
Troxel did more to confuse than clarify the law in the area of grandparents’ rights laws.  On 
the one hand, the case can be read broadly as reaffirming that parents have a fundamental 
right to control the upbringing of their children and as providing a basis for invalidating 
orders for grandparent visitation over the objection of fit parents.  On the other hand, Troxel 
can be read as a very narrow decision that involved a particularly broad law applied in a 
situation where the parent was fit and regular grandparent visitation still occurred.  The 
absence of a majority opinion makes it even more difficult to assess the impact of the 
decision other than the certainty that it will lead to challenges to grandparents’ rights law 
throughout the country. 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 833 (Wolters Kluwer, 4th ed. 
2011). 
 40. Grandparent visitation statutes are listed in Robyn L. Ginsberg, Grandparents’ Visitation 
Rights: The Constitutionality of New York’s Domestic Relations Law Section 72 After Troxel v. 
Granville, 65 ALB. L. REV. 205, 205 n.2 (2001) while grandparent and third party visitation statutes are 
reviewed in Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law Regarding the Rights of Third Parties to Seek Visitation and 
Custody of Children, 47 FAM. L.Q. 1, 1-2 (2013).  The post-Troxel state cases on the constitutionality of 
such statutes are reviewed in Sonya C. Garza, The Troxel Aftermath: A Proposed Solution for State 
Courts and Legislatures, 69 LA. L. REV. 927, 940-42 (2009). 
 41. See, e.g., Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn’t Know Best: Quasi-Parents 
and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV. 865, 891 (2003). 
 42. Id. at 891-93.  
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over a significant period of time” and have established parentage 
gradations.43  States have recognized as parents many who intend to parent.  
States sometimes declare one to be a parent in one setting but not in 
another.44  State lawmakers more freely recognize new parents when there 
are no existing parents whose superior rights might be infringed.  Further, 
states now infrequently recognize a third parent with childcare standing.  
Variations in state parent childcare laws are unsurprising since the United 
States Supreme Court has said that the regulation of domestic relations rests 
within the “virtually exclusive province of the states.”45 
Since Troxel, state lawmakers have recognized child caretaking 
interests for children of single parents in new second parents46 through such 
doctrines as presumed parent,47 de facto parent,48 in loco parentis,49 
 
 43. Id.  
 44. See, e.g., In re C.C., 959 N.E.2d 53, 63 (Ill. 2011) (man may be father in dissolution 
proceeding, but not in a child neglect and shelter proceeding) and People v. Zajaczkowski, 825 N.W.2d 
554, 558-59 (Mich. 2012) (presumption of natural ties and thus parentage in husband whose wife bears 
child for dissolution case purposes does not operate when criminal prosecution depends on criminal 
defendant’s being “related by blood” to crime victim). 
 45. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975). 
 46. These doctrines are employed, at times, to determine a single parent, as when any biological 
parent with superior rights has died or abandoned the child.  See, e.g., Marquez v. Caudill, 656 S.E.2d 
737, 743-45 (S.C. 2008) (“psychological parent” of child, whose birth mother died and whose biological 
father had his parental rights terminated, could be either the child’s stepfather or maternal grandmother). 
 47. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-504(a)(v) (West 2003) (man is a presumed father if for 
first two years of child’s life, he resided in same household with child and openly held child out as his 
own) and TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(5) (West 2003) (similar).  Some comparably presumed 
fathers are, however, also deemed biological parents – though clearly without biological ties.  See, e.g., 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-105(1)(d) (West 2008) (man is presumed natural father if he “receives 
the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child”) and IND. CODE ANN. § 31-
14-7-2(a) (West 2009) (similar for “presumed biological father”).  This presumption as to “natural” or 
“biological” ties is confusing as a man very likely with actual genetic ties is also typically assumed a 
presumed “natural” father who may lose the presumption, and parental status, to one without “natural” 
ties who received and held out the child; a better approach is to presume parenthood without reference to 
presumed natural or biological ties.  See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(5) (West 2003); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-204(A)(5) (West 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-20-10(1)(e) (West 2013); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7700-204(A)(5) (West 2006); and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-504(a)(v) 
(West 2003) (man presumed a father, though not the natural father) if he resided with child for his/her 
first two years and represented to others that child was his own).  Compare, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 19-4-105(1)(d), (e), and (2) (man who received and held out child, as well as man with 97 
percent chance of natural ties to child, are each “presumed natural father”; when two such men qualify 
for the presumption, only one continues as a presumed father, with the choice dependent “on the 
weightier considerations of policy and logic”). 
 48. See, e.g., In re L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 163 (Wash. 2005) (common law de facto parentage claim 
was available to former lesbian partner).  And see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257c.01(2) (West 2003) (“de 
facto custodian”) and KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (West 2004) (statutory “de facto custodian”), 
employed in Hicks v. Halsey, 402 S.W.3d 79, 81 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013) (minor child’s aunt can seek de 
facto custodial status, which would afford her “equal status with parents in court” if she prevails); J.L.A. 
v. S.C., 2013 WL 843815 at 1 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013) (paternal grandparents are de facto custodians); and 
Brumfield v. Stinson, 368 S.W.3d 116, 119 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (insufficient evidence to support finding 
paternal grandparents are de facto custodians). 
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equitable parent,50 equitable estoppel,51 and “psychological parent.”52  Such 
second parents are not always romantically involved with the single 
parents.53  Such second parents need not always have simultaneously both 
childcare opportunities and child support obligations.54  And such second 
parents may not always be on equal footing with the first parents.55 
Elsewhere, while often sympathetic to alleged second parents who seek 
to childcare, in the absence of statutes some state judges have deferred to 
elected legislators in their own state’s “representative democracy.”56  Some 
 
 49. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 97 So.3d 43, 47 (Miss. 2012) (in loco parentis status, with possible 
visitation or custody rights, can be accorded maternal grandparents only if there has been a clear 
showing of abandonment, desertion, or unfitness on the part of the parent); Morgan v. Weiser, 923 A.2d 
1183, 1187 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (once established, rights and liabilities arising from in loco parentis 
relationship are exactly the same as between biological or adoptive parent and child); and Latham v. 
Schwerdtfeger, 802 N.W.2d 66, 122 (Neb. 2011) (former female domestic partner of birth mother, who 
had earlier agreed to raise child jointly, can employ common law doctrine of in loco parentis after split 
with birth mother). 
 50. See, e.g., Lipnevicius v. Lipnevicius,  2012 WL 3318584 at 1, 3-4 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (the 
equitable parent doctrine, adopted in Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987), 
cannot be used by former husband of child’s mother where his marital presumption of paternity was 
earlier rebutted and where the natural father had been judicially declared the father under law). 
 51. See, e.g., Juanita A. v. Kenneth N., 930 N.E.2d 214, 215 (N.Y. 2010) (putative father could 
assert equitable estoppel defense when sued by natural mother for child support if mother acquiesced in 
the development of a close relationship between the child and another father figure and when the 
disruption of that relationship would be detrimental to the child’s interests). 
 52. See, e.g., In re M.W., 292 P.3d 1158, 1159 (Colo. App. 2012) (construing COLO .REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 14-10-123(1) (West 2012) (allowing the pursuit of an allocation of parental responsibilities for a 
child in one who had physical care of the child for six months or more and who pursues within six 
months of the termination of such care); McAllister, 779 N.W.2d at 662 (stepfather is psychological 
parent entitled to visitation though both natural parents also had court childcare orders); and Bredeson v. 
Mackey, 842 N.W.2d 860, 865 (stepmother, wife of biological father who was incarcerated, is not a 
psychological parent who may be awarded visitation, though other stepparents could be psychological 
parents). 
 53. See, e.g., E.C. v. J.V., 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 339, 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 
 54. Recognition of parental status in both childcare and support settings, per de facto parenthood 
for example, does not mean that dual status continues, as when the father – after the holding out – later 
abandons the child and thereby loses only his childcare status.  Child support can continue though 
opportunity for court-ordered childcare ends.  See, e.g., In re Beck, 793 N.W.2d 562, 563-64 (Mich. 
2010) and Ex Parte M.D.C., 39 So.3d 1117, 1132 (Ala. 2009).  See also Aeda v. Aeda, 310 P.3d 646, 
647 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (under New Mexico but not some other state laws, termination of father’s 
parental rights ended father’s child support obligations). 
 55. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-228 (West 2009) and MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-211(7) 
(West 2009) (“a court may award a parental interest to a person other than a natural parent,” who can 
then seek visitation; custody proceedings may be commenced “by a parent”).  Also consider other 
settings as in In re T.P.S., 954 N.E.2d 673, 678 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (though a court-recognized 
coguardian of child, same sex partner of birth mother  would need to “prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that a continuation of the guardianship is in the child’s best interests” when birth mother seeks 
to terminate the guardianship). 
 56. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  For example, in a case involving a former 
boyfriend (Jim) seeking to establish parentage of a child (Scarlett) who had been adopted by his former 
girlfriend during a romantic relationship, In re Scarlett Z.–D., 975 N.E.2d 755, 772 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012), 
the court said: 
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legislatures have responded quickly to judicial pleas for guidance on the 
legal effects of changing family structures.57 
Whether via statutes or precedents, state lawmakers have recognized, 
over single parent objection, second parent status for a heretofore nonparent 
because of harm or potential harm to the child or because of varying forms 
of earlier single parent and nonparent consent, acquiescence, or other 
conduct regarding child caretaking.58  The federal constitutional childcare 
interests of single parents, often embodied within the superior rights 
doctrine, are overridden when second parents are accorded standing to seek 
childcare orders.59  Exemplary state laws follow. 
(i) Harm or Potential Harm to the Child 
The Troxel plurality and one concurring justice reserved the question of 
whether any “nonparental” childcare over parental objection must “include 
 
While we are not unsympathetic to Jim’s position, or indeed, to Scarlett’s situation . . . not 
only would it be inappropriate for us to ignore existing Illinois law, but our doing so would 
likely be fraught with unintended consequences.  Legal change in this complex area of social 
significance must be the product of careful, extensive policy debate, sensitive not only to the 
evolving realities of nontraditional families and the needs of the persons within those 
families, not the least of whom are the children, but also to parents’ fundamental liberty 
interest embodied in the superior rights doctrine and its restriction of the ability of the state to 
interfere in family matters.  In short, the comprehensive legislative solution demanded here 
must be provided by our General Assembly. 
See also In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 653 (Wis. 2013) (“we respectfully urge the legislature to 
consider enacting legislation regarding surrogacy.  Surrogacy is currently a reality in our Wisconsin 
court system.”) and Debra H. v. Janice R., 14 N.Y.3d 576, 596 (N.Y. 2010) (“We agree . . . that any 
change in the meaning of ‘parent’ under our law should come by way of legislative enactment rather 
than judicial revamping of precedent.”). 
  It should be noted, however that sometimes common law rulings are made even though 
legislation is preferred.  See, e.g., K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d 798, 811 (Pa. 2012) (J. Melvin, concurring) 
(affirming “the continuing viability of the estoppel doctrine in Pennsylvania common law” though 
believing “the General Assembly should consider creation of relevant legislation”). 
 57. Consider, e.g., the history behind the Delaware statute on de facto parenthood, DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 13 § 8-201 (West 2013), described in Bancroft, 19 A.3d at 749 (“The Delaware Legislature 
quickly responded to the Supreme Court’s Decision in Smith v. Gordon by passing the present de facto 
parent amendment to Delaware’s Uniform Parentage Act.”). 
 58. Thaddius A. Townsend, Going Before Solomon With A Special Request: The Need For 
Clearer Legal Regulation of Shared Custody Rights Between Parents And Non-biological Parents, 41 
CAP. U. L. REV. 327, 347 (2013).  
 59. The level of required consent, acquiescence, or other conduct by both the first and second 
parent may need to be varied depending upon context.  In Washington, for example, de facto parentage 
can be recognized for a former stepparent upon a showing that “the natural or legal parent consented to 
and fostered the parent-like relationship” between stepparent and stepchild.  B.M.H., 315 P.3d at 478 
(citing In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176 (Wash. 2005)). Yet, as Chief Justice Madsen observed 
in concurring/dissenting, “the consent prong is meaningless in the stepparent context.  Consent to 
coparent within the marriage and family unit is not the same as consent to a life-long, parent-child 
relationship on the part of the stepparent to continue no matter what happens to the marriage.”  B.M.H., 
315 P.3d at 483. 
2014] CONSTRAINTS ON SECOND PARENT LAWS 823 
a showing of harm or potential harm to the child.”60  Seemingly, at least, 
such a showing might also be deemed necessary for any second parentage 
designation in a childcare setting, although perhaps more may be required 
for second parent than nonparent childcare standing as only with the later 
might loss of custody in the single parent be possible.  To date, few “harm 
to the child” standards have been employed in second parent settings,61 
though similar standards operate for some nonparental62 childcare orders.63 
For example, a Utah appeals court recently surveyed grandparent 
visitation statutes and found that “many,” but not all, American states 
permit grandparent visitation orders over parental objection “only where 
denial of visitation would significantly harm the grandchild.”64  It added that 
 
 60. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 58 (plurality opinion). 
 61. But see Janice M. v. Margaret R., 948 A.2d 73, 87 (Md. 2008) (rejecting any de facto parent 
status, here with a former same sex partner of adoptive mother; but finding that any de facto parent 
status alone would not be determinative of “exceptional circumstances” resulting in serious detriment to 
child – which with parental unfitness – can warrant second parent or nonparent childcare orders over 
parental objection) and Copeland v. Todd, 715 S.E.2d 11, 20 (Va. 2011) (detriment to child’s welfare, 
together with some showing of parental unfitness, can prompt adoption of child without parental 
consent). 
 62. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of S.M.N., 781 N.W.2d 213, 224 (S.D. 2010) (nonparent may 
obtain childcare order via guardianship proceeding over parental objection by proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that extraordinary circumstances (beyond abandonment, neglect, forfeiture or 
abdication) exist which, if nonparent childcare is denied, would result in serious detriment to the child, 
per S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29(4) (2002)).  Compare In re A.W., 994 N.E.2d 726, 730 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2013) (widowed wife of deceased father who had custody of A.W. could seek guardianship of A.W. if 
she rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence the presumption that the birth mother is “willing and 
able to make and carry out day-to-day child-care decisions concerning A.W.”).  See also TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 153.131(a) (West 1997) (parents should be appointed managing conservators unless 
appointments would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development), applied 
in In re Crumbley, 404 S.W.3d 156, 162-63 (Tex. App. 2013) (no rebuttal of presumption of superior 
parental authority as managing conservator where parent only “voluntarily relinquished” child to 
nonparent for extended time, even though nonparent conservatorship would be in the best interests of 
child). 
 63. For the social science and psychological research on children’s attachments to nonparents 
(therein deemed psychological parents), see Rebecca L. Scharf, Psychological Parentage, Troxel, and 
the Best Interests of the Child, 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 615, 628-29, 641 (2012) (supporting “harm to 
the child” standard in third party visitation cases wherein parents object). 
 64. Jones v. Jones, 307 P.3d 598, 606-07 (Utah Ct. App. 2013).  See generally AM. LAW INST., 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.18(2)(c) (2002) (custodial and decisionmaking 
responsibility for a minor child, per Section 201, may be assigned to a grandparent over a parent’s 
objections if “the available alternatives would cause harm to the child”) [hereinafter ALI Principles].  
Compare L.A.L. v. V.D., 72 A.3d 690, 695 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (grandparents of children of unwed 
parents have standing to seek partial child custody; grandparents and great-grandparents may be awarded 
custody if they earlier had much “personal contact” with the child, the child’s best interests would be 
served, and a custody award would not interfere with any parent-child relationship, per 23 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 5328(c)(1) (West 2014)); In re Guardianship of S.M.N., 781 N.W.2d 213, 223 (S.D. 2010) 
(“petitioner [here a grandmother] must demonstrate extraordinary circumstances by clear and convincing 
evidence to overcome a natural parents’ presumptive right to custody”); and Fairhurst v. Moon, 416 
S.W.3d 788, 792 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013) (grandparent visits over parental objection when “clear and 
convincing evidence that the parent is mistaken in the belief that visitation would not be in the best 
interests of the child”).  And see AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 
2.18(2)(a) (2002) (custodial and decision-making responsibility for a minor child may be assigned to a 
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evidence as to harm usually had to be “compelling,”65 and that even with 
such evidence, any grandparent visitation order must be “narrowly 
tailored.”66 
Yet even when there is or may be a harm or potential harm standard, 
actual harm or potential harm is often not required where a single parent 
initially agrees to second parent status or to nonparty childcare standing.67  
Thus, though superior parental rights must be respected in an initial 
grandparent visitation proceeding via a harm or potential harm standard, 
such rights frequently give way when an earlier stipulated grandparent 
visitation order is sought to be modified;68 here, modification usually may 
be undertaken with just the best interests of the child in mind.69 
Similarly, single parent pacts on their children’s new second parents are 
often significant, if not determinative, in assessing the single parent’s later 
objection to a second parent designation in certain assisted human 
reproduction settings.  For example, birth mothers are often bound to 
preconception promises of second parent status when the second intended 
parent is the egg donor.70 
(ii)  No Harm or Potential Harm to the Child 
The Troxel plurality and one concurring justice reserved the question of 
whether any “nonparental” childcare over parental objection must “include 
a showing of harm or potential harm to the child.”71  To date, such a 
showing is often unnecessary for a second parent designation and an 
 
grandparent over a parent’s objection if the grandparent has a “significant relationship with the child” 
and the objecting parent “has not been performing a reasonable share of parenting functions for the 
child”). 
 65. Jones, 307 P.3d at 608. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See, e.g. Townsend, supra note 58, at 334. 
 68. See, e.g., Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 31 (Tenn. 2013) (“extraordinary circumstance” 
can justify “applying the presumption of superior parental rights” in modification proceedings) and 
Richard B. v. C.W., 2014 WL 243059 at 2-3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (mother did not appeal 2007 order 
placing her child with maternal grandmother; in 2012, grandmother can maintain custody even if mother 
is not unfit as detriment to child includes removal from a stable placement). 
 69. Lovlace, 418 S.W.3d at 38 (“the paramount consideration . . . is the welfare of the child” with 
“the interests and desires of adult parties . . . secondary to this paramount concern”). 
 70. Single parents may also be bound to later (postconception) promises of nonparent (as well as 
second parent) childcare standing.  See, e.g., A.M.K., 351 Wis.2d at ¶¶ 3-4 (child born in 1998, who was 
raised together by two women until 2006, was subject to 2006 written agreement to “equal shared 
placement” and shared expenses; after agreement was reneged upon by birth mother in 2008, court finds 
former partner had standing to seek a nonparent childcare order, but could not be ordered to pay child 
support). 
 71. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 58 (plurality opinion). 
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ensuing childcare order benefitting the second parent.72  Best interests 
standards frequently dominate.73 
Federal constitutional childcare interests of a single parent are 
adequately protected, without a showing of harm, where a nonparent may be 
newly designated as a second parent over the first parent’s later objection 
only when the child’s best interests are served and only when the first parent 
and theretofore nonparent earlier voluntarily participated in a state-
recognized guardianship proceeding, outside of a formal adoption, wherein 
the nonparent was designated, or treated like, a second parent with the 
consent of the first parent.74  On rare occasion, such a proceeding can 
involve an adoption granted by a court, but later deemed void for 
jurisdictional defects.75  More often, such a proceeding involves a 
guardianship wherein a single parent copetitions with another76 for a joint 
childcare guardianship for a (future or present) child where the guardianship 
 
 72. See Maldonado, supra note 41, at 871.  
 73. Id.  
 74. A voluntary guardianship naming a nonparent as guardian with a parent’s agreement does not 
by itself elevate the guardian to parental status.  See, e.g., Masitto v. Masitto, 488 N.E.2d 857, 859 (Ohio 
1986) (maternal grandparents were guardians per parental consent); Book-Gilbert v. Greenleaf, 840 
N.W.2d 743, 749 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013); and Resendes v. Brown, 966 A.2d 1249, 1256 (R.I. 2009) 
(stipulation by mother as to guardianship made the guardian a “de facto” parent as issue was removed 
from controversy).  Here, the parent and guardian often will share childcare.  But such a voluntary 
guardianship can “guide” a later judicial determination of whether the nonparent guardian’s should later 
be deemed a parent.  By comparison, an involuntary guardianship can deprive a single parent of child 
custody over the parent’s objection, as where a petitioning nonparent demonstrates the parent is 
unwilling or unable to make and carry out day-to-day childcare decisions.  A.W., 994 N.E.2d at 729 
(rebuttal of statutory presumption of parental fitness; evidentiary hearing often required).  Usually, an 
involuntary guardianship in a nonparent accompanies an order of parental unfitness and a finding of the 
child’s best interests.  See, e.g., In re Guardianship of LaBree, 76 A.3d 386, 389 (Me. 2013) (involuntary 
guardianship in nonparent cannot be accompanied by order naming parent as coguardian).  But see In re 
S.H., 2013 WL 5519847 at ¶ 25 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (limited guardianship for medical decision making 
purposes when parents refuse to permit medical treatment for seriously ill child).  On voluntary and 
involuntary guardianships, see also In re F.G., 2012 WL 6013184 at 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 
 75. See, e.g., Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 494, 496 (N.C. 2010) (after voiding earlier 
adoption by birth mother’s same sex partner, court views ex-partner as nonparty with standing to seek 
childcare order because birth mother, during earlier adoption proceeding, acted inconsistently with her 
protected status as mother).  See also Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 S.W.3d 569, 571 (Ky. 2010) (while 
voiding earlier agreed custody award to birth mother and her former same sex partner as there was fraud 
in employing de facto custodian statute, birth mother waived her superior parental rights by coparenting 
with former partner and the women were each awarded joint custody).  Compare In re Guardianship of 
A.J.A., 991 N.E.2d 110, 111 (Ind. 2013) (grandparent visitation agreement with child’s guardians found 
in a court order cannot serve as a basis for later grandparent visits when order was void as grandparent 
earlier had no standing under Grandparent Visitation act). 
 76. The joinder by the single parent in the petition often does not relieve the court of the duty to 
find the necessary jurisdictional grounds.  See, e.g., In re A.C.F.H., 373 S.W.3d 148, 149-50 (Tex. App. 
2012) (under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9) (West 2012), stepfather cannot seek joint managing 
conservatorship with biological mother unless he “had actual care, control, and possession of the child 
for at least six months ending not more than 90 days preceding the date of the filing of the petition”). 
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is not temporary77 or otherwise limited in nature.78  An adoptive or assisted 
reproduction single parent may even be able to copetition with an intimate 
partner for co-guardianship in a state when the forum bars coadoption by 
the partner (e.g., due to being unwed)79 or when an assisted reproduction 
proceeds in the forum outside the bounds of any statute, but where any third 
party gametes donor and any surrogate have already lost any opportunity for 
second parent status.80 
 
 77. Witham v. Beck, 2013 Ark. App. 351, 8 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013) (fit natural parent who consents 
to child guardianship in a nonparent can later terminate guardianship over nonparent’s objection; 
nonparent can continue guardianship only by showing conditions necessitating guardianship have not 
been removed or by overcoming the presumption that the parent is acting in the child’s best interests). 
 78. See, e.g., Chris v. Vanessa O., 320 P.3d 16, 17-18 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (under the Kinship 
Guardianship Act, following a referral to the state regarding a birth parent’s alleged failure in childcare, 
with that parent’s consent a couple was first appointed as temporary guardians, and later as permanent 
guardians, with appointments designed to facilitate the transition of the childcare back to the parent; 
couple later did seek to adopt child). 
 79. Of course, Full Faith and Credit may need to be accorded in the forum to a sister state’s laws 
on the childcare when the child in the forum only recently arrived.  Similarly, certain foreign country 
laws on childcare may need to be respected per any treaty.  Further, comity principles may allow certain 
copetitions because of the forum state’s deference to some other state or foreign country’s public policies 
on childcare, even for children born within the forum.  See, e.g., Debra H., 14 N.Y.3d at 600 (comity 
given to effect of Vermont civil union law on parentage for birth to same sex female couple in New York 
who were unionized in Vermont after artificial insemination, but before birth, in New York which had 
no civil union law). 
  Comparably, other governments’ laws, as on marriages, civil unions, and the like, may need 
to be respected.  See, e.g., Port v. Cowan, 44 A.3d 970, 982 (Md. 2012) (though same sex marriage not 
recognized in Maryland, comity requires that Maryland court utilize Maryland divorce laws for same sex 
couple married in California) and Hunter v. Rose, 975 N.E.2d 857, 859 (Mass. 2012) (California 
registered same sex domestic partnership recognized under principles of comity in Massachusetts 
dissolution proceeding).  Compare 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 1996) (“A marriage between 
persons of the same sex which was entered into in another state or foreign jurisdiction, even if valid 
where entered into, shall be void in this Commonwealth.”).  Yet see Bourke v. Beshear, 2014 WL 
556729 at 1 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (finding comparable Kentucky laws violate federal constitutional Equal 
Protection because they serve no rational basis; court does not consider the federal constitutional Full 
Faith and Credit mandates). 
  Consider also, e.g., the effects of nonforum laws on, e.g., spousal privileges, entitlements to 
benefits, and death certificate notations about family.  Of course, federal or state constitutional demands 
involving a fundamental right to childrear may require certain copetitions be recognized.  See, e.g., Meg 
Penrose, Unbreakable Vows: Same-Sex Marriage and the Fundamental Right to Divorce, 58 VILL. L. 
REV. 169, 172 (2013) (arguing fundamental right to divorce requires a state where gay marriage is not 
recognized to allow divorces of same sex couples who married outside the state). 
 80. Postbirth guardianship copetitions were sustained in Morgan v. Kifus, 2011 WL 1362691 at 3 
(Va. Ct. App. 2011) (joint legal custody in two women who were one time lovers, one of whom was the 
birth mother who seemingly conceived via artificial insemination that was facilitated by a male friend, 
where both women had agreed preinsemination to raise any child jointly; custody modification was not, 
but could have been, sought by birth mother); T.P.S., 954 N.E.2d at 678 (earlier coguardianship orders 
on two children of same-sex female couple gave standing to nonbirth mother to oppose later 
guardianship termination requests by birth mother; to continue as guardian nonbirth mother must “prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that a continuation of the guardianship is in the children’s best 
interests”). 
  Comparable issues arise when earlier consensual guardianships are sought to be continued on 
behalf of nonparents, like grandparents, who were not in intimate relationships with biological or 
adoptive parents.  See, e.g., In re Guardianship of S.H., 409 S.W.3d 307, 316, 320 (Ark. 2012) (majority 
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As with voluntary guardianships involving parents and would-be 
parents, other consent decrees between parents and nonparents on nonparent 
childcare, as during grandparent visitation proceedings, also adequately 
protect superior parental rights.  Thus, when parents later seek to modify 
such consent decrees, often they are deemed to be without the parental 
rights presumption that they act in their children’s best interests.81  To 
modify here, the parents must show substantial change in circumstances and 
children’s best interests.82 
Unlike voluntary guardianships and consent decrees, state-recognized 
proceedings outside of formal adoption and involving parents and would-be 
parents need not include major indices of state approval, via a judge or via 
administrative process guidelines.  Thus at times the state is not 
significantly, or even somewhat assured, that the prospective second parent 
will serve the child’s best interests and that both the first and prospective 
second parent understand the implications of their conduct.  Professor 
Harris has suggested that the administrative voluntary parentage 
acknowledgment process (VAP) be made available to actual and intended 
parents in same sex relationships.83  Zachary Townsend and I suggested 
expanded VAP availability for prebirth acknowledgments by unwed 
expectant mothers and by either alleged biological fathers or intimate 
partners of the expectant mothers regarding children who will be born of 
sex.84  A VAP has also been significant when undertaken by the unwed birth 
 
requires birth mother who opposes continuing guardianship by paternal grandparents to prove 
guardianship is no longer necessary; dissent believes grandparents should be required to rebut the 
presumption that a parent acts in a child’s best interest and to prove that the guardianship remains 
necessary).  Compare Witham, 2013 Ark. App. at 8 (intimate former same sex partner who was child’s 
guardian while mother was in military – where some guardianship of a single soldier’s child was 
required, had to prove that guardianship termination was not in child’s interest once mother shows 
condition necessitating guardianship was removed). 
 81. Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: ERISA, 
Jurisdiction, and Third-Party Cases Multiply, 40 FAM. L.Q. 545, 586-87 (2007).  
 82. See, e.g., Rennels v. Rennels, 257 P.3d 396, 401 (Nev. 2011) (earlier visitation, as well as 
custody, order favoring nonparent “effectively rebutted the parental presumption, after which the child’s 
need for stability becomes a paramount concern”).  See also In re Marriage of Purcell, 825 N.E.2d 724, 
724 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (birth mother’s earlier joint-parenting agreement with husband in marriage 
dissolution proceeding is still enforceable even after husband becomes stepparent when his lack of 
biological ties is proven later in order for the child to receive benefits via biological father). 
 83. Compare Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage for Same-Sex 
Couples, 20 J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 467, 487-88 (contrary to most current VAP laws, suggesting a 
VAP be available where at least one acknowledger has no biological ties to the child – as when a lesbian 
partner of the birth mother acknowledges parentage with the birth mother though the partner provided no 
genetic material leading to pregnancy).  See also Laura Nicole Althouse, Three’s Company? How 
American Law Can Recognize a Third Social Parent in Same-Sex Headed Families, 19 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S L.J. 171, 201-08 (2008) (on expanding VAPs to same sex couples who coparent though there 
may be three parents). 
 84. Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, For Those Not John Edwards: More and Better 
Paternity Acknowledgments at Birth, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 96 (2010) (with care taken for the 
paternity opportunity interests under Lehr for the unwed biological father who is not an acknowledger). 
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mother and sperm donor for a child born of assisted reproduction even when 
the mother later objects to the donor’s paternity action.85 
States may also recognize earlier acts by parents ceding some parental 
authority that do not involve state-controlled proceedings at all, as with 
private contracts involving parentage.86  The ALI Restatement (Second) on 
Contracts says: “A promise affecting the right of custody of a minor child is 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy unless the disposition as to 
custody is consistent with the best interest of the child.”87  Professor 
Carbone has suggested that both married and unmarried couples intending 
to parent should, “shortly after the child’s birth,” make a commitment in “a 
ceremony modeled on christening.”88  Promises made in such ceremonies, 
and elsewhere,89 could then often be considered and perhaps enforced.  
Here, superior parental rights are significantly protected. 
Federal constitutional childcare interests of a single parent are also 
significantly protected when a nonparent may only be designated a second 
parent over a single parent’s objection where the nonparent had a subjective 
intent to adopt that was directly expressed and known to the single parent 
who did not object; held out the child as one’s own; and formed a close and 
enduring familial relationship with the child.90  These standards were 
suggested to two Illinois intermediate appellate courts in 201391 by the 
Illinois Supreme Court,92 which had just employed the norms in a case 
involving an alleged child who sought recovery under an equitable adoption 
theory from the estate of a heretofore nonparent under law.93 
On the other hand, federal constitutional childcare interests of a single 
parent are less protected, raising more serious concerns under Troxel, when 
absolute parental authority turns to shared parental authority because the 
single parent allows a nonparent to do childcare chores while living in the 
 
 85. Breit v. Mason, 718 S.E.2d 482, 489 (Va. Ct. App. 2011) (donor could petition for paternity 
determination). 
 86. See Linda D. Elrod, A Child’s Perspective of Defining a Parent: The Case for Intended 
Parenthood, 25 BYU J. Pub. L. 245, 267-68 (2011).  
 87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 191 (1981). 
 88. June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the Core of Family 
Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1344 (2005). 
 89. See, e.g., Frazier, 295 P.3d at 545-46 (former female partner of birth mother, with birth via 
artificial insemination, could enforce coparenting agreements regarding two children, with at least one 
agreement occurring prebirth) and C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 524, 525 (Ohio Comm. Pls. 1994) 
(agreement upheld between sperm donor and unwed birth mother that there would be a relationship 
between donor and any child, where mother had solicited donor’s participation). 
 90. See, e.g. In re J. LaPiana, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 2010-Ohio-3606.  
 91. In re Marriage of Mancine, 965 N.E.2d 592, 596 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) and Scarlett Z.-D., 975 
N.E.2d at 768. 
 92. Mancine v. Gansner, 992 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2013) and In re Scarlett Z.-D., 992 N.E.2d 3 (Ill. 
2013). 
 93. DeHart v. DeHart, 986 N.E.2d 85, 100, 104-05 (Ill. 2013). 
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same household with the single parent and child.94  Lesser protections 
seemingly are afforded to single parents in New Jersey, where a man with 
no biological or formal adoptive ties can be “presumed to be the biological 
father of a child,” on equal footing with the birth mother, if he “openly 
holds out the child as his natural child” and either “receives the child into 
his home” or “provides support for the child.”95  By contrast, the District of 
Columbia law on de facto parenthood requires, with the single parent’s 
“agreement,” residency in the same household since the time of the child’s 
birth or adoption, or for at least ten of the twelve months preceding the 
nonparent’s petition for de facto parent status.96  A Delaware law does not 
mention residency at all, permitting de facto parenthood for a second parent 
if one “exercised “parental responsibility” and served in a “parental role” so 
that “a bonded and dependent relationship” developed that is “parental in 
nature,” although this must be done with “the support and consent of the 
child’s parent.”97  Residency, but a lesser degree of first parent consent,  is 
crucial to presumed parentage in Delaware, where a “man is presumed the 
father of a child if . . . for the first 2 years of the child’s life, he resided in 
 
 94. See, e.g., David D. Meyer, What Constitutional Law Can Learn from the ALI Principles of 
Family Dissolution, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1075, 1077, 1084-85 and 1099-103 (many read Troxel as 
placing “in doubt” the constitutionality of the ALI’s pronouncement on ceding parental interests based 
solely on a nonparent undertaking household chores and living in a household for a certain period of 
time; yet author reads Troxel as containing “seeds of a constitutional doctrine quite favorable to the ALI 
Principles” that recognize legal parents, parents by estoppel and de facto parents).  And see Wilson, 
supra note 37, at 484 (arguing that such shared parental authority unduly “overrides the judgments of 
mothers without sufficient consideration for the risks to children”).  See also Niesen v. Niesen, 157 
N.W.2d 660, 664 (Wis. 1968) (citation omitted), where the court said: 
A stepfather is under no obligation to support the child of his wife by a former husband so as 
to relieve him from support.  In some cases where the stepfather takes the child into his 
family or under his care in such a way that he in fact intends and does place himself in the 
position of the father and is so accepted by the child, he may thereby assume an obligation to 
support such child.  But a good Samaritan should not be saddled with the legal obligations of 
another and we think the law should not with alacrity conclude that a stepparent assumes 
parental relationships to a child. 
 
 95. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43(a)(4) and (5) (West 1998) (no indication of a need for the single 
parent’s consent) and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-40 (West 1983) (“The parent and child relationship 
extends equally to every child and to every parent”).  See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-45(d) (West 1998) 
(no agreement between alleged or presumed father and mother can bar an action to determine the 
existence or nonexistence of a parent and child relationship except for an agreement “approved by the 
court”). 
 96. D.C. CODE § 16-831.01(1) (2009). 
 97. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (West 2013).  These Code provisions may not permit, 
however, de facto parenthood for a third parent.  See, e.g., Bancroft, 19 A.3d at 750 (statute is overbroad 
and violative of due process privacy rights of fit mother and fit father if another person is also named as 
third parent).  The Washington state common law on de facto parentage is similar.  L.P., 122 P.3d at 179 
(first parent must consent to and foster parent-child relationship with another; de facto parent status 
requires “active encouragement of the biological or adoptive parent”). 
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the same household with the child and openly held out the child as his 
own.”98 
Outside of Delaware, some presumed parent statutes operate like the 
Delaware presumed parent statute while others operate like the Delaware de 
facto parent statute.  As in Delaware, presumed parentage arises in New 
Mexico,99 North Dakota,100 Oklahoma,101 Texas,102 Washington,103 and 
Wyoming104 for those who establish residency in the first two years and 
hold out children as their own.105  The demands of any first parent “support 
and consent” are unclear. 
Like de facto parentage in Delaware, there is no timed residency 
requirement on presumed parentage in other states.  In Alabama, presumed 
parentage arises for a man who receives the child into his home and openly 
holds out the child as his natural child, or otherwise openly holds out the 
child as his natural child and establishes or has a significant parental 
relationship with the child involving emotional and financial support.106  
Elsewhere, there is presumed parentage for a man who receives a child into 
the home and holds out the child as his own.107  Here, any requirements of 
first parent “support and consent” are unclear, thus often undercutting 
superior parental rights to the surprise of the first parent. 
Comparably, lesser protections of a single parent’s childcare interests 
are afforded by laws affording childcare opportunities to persons who may 
never be designated parents under law.  In Oregon, “any person . . . who has 
 
 98. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-204(a)(5) (West 2004). 
 99. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-204(A)(5) (West 2010) (same language as in Delaware). 
 100. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-20-10(1)(e) (West 2013) (same language as in Delaware). 
 101. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7700-204(A)(5) (West 2006) (same language as in Delaware). 
 102. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(5) (West 2003) (“continuously resided in the household 
in which the child resided and he represented to others that the child was his own”). 
 103. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116(2) (West 2011). 
 104. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-504(a)(v) (West 2003). 
 105. At times, not holding out a child as one’s own is used to rebut rather than establish presumed 
parentage.  See, e.g., DeBoer v. DeBoer, 822 N.W.2d 730, 734 (S.D. 2012) (presumed parent due to 
postbirth marriage and voluntary assertion of paternity may be rebutted by evidence the presumed parent 
“never represented to others that the child was his own,” per TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(4) and 
160.607(b)). 
 106. ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(a)(5) (2009).  While presumed parentage statutes, as in Alabama, 
recognize only men as second parents, women have been deemed second parents under such statutes 
because the laws are read in gender neutral ways.  See, e.g., In re Domestic Partnership of C.P. and D.F., 
2013 WL 2099156 at 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). 
 107. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-105(1)(d) 
(West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.55 (West 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-304 (West 2010); and 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.051 (West 2007).  Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 6(a)(4) 
(West 1998) (man presumed to be a father if “he, jointly with the mother, received the child into their 
home and openly held out the child as their child”).  In California, established presumed parentage may 
not operate in all settings where parentage is important.  See, e.g., Brianna M., 163 Cal.Rptr.3d at 668-69 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (father’s presumed biological paternity was not relevant in dependency  
proceeding). 
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established emotional ties creating a child-parent relationship or an ongoing 
personal relationship with a child may petition” may file for a childcare 
order.108  But such an order can only follow the rebuttal of a presumption 
“that the legal parent acts in the best interest of the child,” where the court 
“may consider” whether the “legal parent has fostered, encouraged or 
consented to the relationship.”109  The Oregon presumption can be 
overcome by “a preponderance of the evidence” where “a child-parent 
relationship exists.”110  But “clear and convincing evidence” is needed in 
Oregon where “an ongoing personal relationship exists.”111  Fostering a 
close relationship is quite different from consenting to later second parent 
status.  Parents want their children to have close and meaningful 
relationships with their teachers, but typically do not view the teachers as 
performing parental-like acts. 
Other nonparent childcare laws offer little protection to superior 
parental rights.  In Montana, a nonparent who “has established a child-
parent relationship” with a child112 can obtain either “a parental interest” in 
the child or “visitation” with the child,113 each dependent upon a judicial 
finding of the child’s best interests, when “clear and convincing evidence” 
demonstrates “the natural parent has engaged in conduct that is contrary to 
the child-parent relationship.”114  Contrary conduct includes “voluntarily 
permitting a child to remain continuously in the care of others for a 
significant period of time so that the others stand in loco parentis to the 
child.”115  Again, there may be no actual consent by the first parent to 
second parent status.  Here, as well, the statutory language, “conduct . . . 
contrary to the child-parent relationship,” seems ill-advised as relevant 
conduct includes acts undertaken to benefit the child and thus the child-
single parent relationship.116  A better approach would be to base a possible 
 
 108. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §109.119(1) (West 2003).  
 109. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §109.119(1), (2)(a) and (b), 4(a)(C), and 4(b)(D) (West 2003). 
 110. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.119(3)(a) (West 2003). 
 111. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.119(3)(b) (West 2003). 
 112. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-211(4)(b) (West 2009) (standing to seek “a parenting plan”). 
 113. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-228(1) (West 2009). 
 114. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-228(2) (West 2009) (clear and convincing evidence of best 
interests for “parental interest” award) and MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-228(3) (West 2009) (visitation 
award “based on the best interests,” with no reference to standard of proof). 
 115. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-228(2)(a) and (4) (West 2009).  Precedent includes In re M.M.G., 
287 P.3d 952, 954 (Mont. 2012), In re L.F.A., 220 P.3d 391, 394 (Mont. 2009), and Kulstad v. Maniaci, 
220 P.3d 595, 609 (Mont. 2009) (in loco parentis status obtainable though nonparent did not act “as a 
parent to the exclusion of the natural parent”).  Compare the Montana provision on terminating parental 
rights that requires child abandonment, defined as “leaving a child under circumstances that make 
reasonable the belief that the parent does not intend to resume care of the child in the near future.”  
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-102(1)(i) (West 2013). 
 116. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-228(2)(a) (West 2009). 
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“parental” interest, or a “visitation” interest, of a nonparent on a single 
parent’s voluntary relinquishment of significant parental authority.117 
In Ohio, a parent is bound to a voluntary permanent shared custody 
agreement with a nonparent, shown by “words or conduct,” by which the 
parent purposefully relinquishes “some portion of the parent’s right to 
exclusive custody” of a child.118  By comparison, an Idaho statute provides a 
bit more, though not absolute, protection of a parent’s superior rights vis-à-
vis a nonparent, as it says: 
In any case where the child is actually residing with a grandparent 
in a stable relationship, the court may recognize the grandparent as 
having the same standing as a parent for evaluating what custody 
arrangements are in the best interests of the child.119 
Superior parent rights are more significantly protected in Mississippi, where 
nonparent childcare standing must be proceeded by a finding the parent 
abandoned or deserted the child, or was unfit, or has “detrimental 
immorality.”120 
While second parents with childcare standing in some states look like 
nonparents with childcare standing in other states, there are often important 
distinctions.  For example, child support obligations often follow only 
second parents.121  But in each setting, a single parent sometimes loses the 
ability to object to the childcare standing of another where sole custody in 
the parent would not harm the child and where the parent may have only 
acted in ways benefitting the child, as by the parent’s ceding some 
 
 117. On similarly unfortunate statutory language, see also In re Perales, 369 N.E.2d 1047, 1052 
n.12 (Ohio 1977) (a finding of parental unsuitability can be based on “contractual relinquishment of 
custody”). 
 118. Rowell v. Smith, 2013 WL 2404814 at 6 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (agreement is enforced when 
child’s best interest is served). 
 119. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717(3) (West 2007), upheld upon an attack under Troxel in 
Hernandez v. Hernandez, 265 P.3d 495, 496 (Idaho 2011) (2 children lived with maternal grandparents 
only for about 7 years, when parents agreed to switch primary custody per court order from mother to 
father – who had had no physical contact with the children before then for about 6 years). 
 120. Davis v. Vaughn, 126 So.3d 33, 38 (Miss. 2013). 
 121. Second parents who can be afforded childcare orders more likely also assume child support 
obligations whether or not they ever seek childcare, while nonparents with standing to seek childcare, as 
with former stepparents or grandparents, are less likely subject to child support duties even if they seek 
childcare orders.  Compare, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201 (West 2013) (de facto parent on equal 
footing, e.g., with birth mother and adoptive parent) with A.M.K., 351 Wis.2d at ¶9 n.3 (former lesbian 
partner as nonparent can seek childcare order over her former partner/mother’s objection but cannot be 
pursued by mother for child support) and Weinand v. Weinand, 616 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Neb. 2000) (former 
stepfather can seek childcare order over parental objection though there is no child support duty for him). 
  There are also other ways beyond shared childcare standing in which acquiescence in shared 
childcare authority can negatively impact a parent.  See, e.g., Starla D. v. Jeremy E., 945 N.Y.S.2d 779, 
781 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (alleged biological father has equitable estoppel defense in mother’s 
paternity suit where mother acquiesced in another man’s parental-like relationship). 
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caretaking authority in order to help the child, with no recognition of any 
possible second parent status and with no purposeful or extended 
relinquishment of parental control.122 
B. Child Support Obligations of Second and Third Parents 
Federal constitutional interests of a nonparent in not incurring unwanted 
child support obligations upon being designated a second (or even third) 
parent at the request of another123 (usually the first parent, child, or state124) 
are significantly protected when the guidelines require that the possible new 
parent had a subjective intention to adopt formally which was directly 
expressed; held out the child as one’s own; and formed a close and enduring 
familial relationship with the child.125  As noted, these standards were 
employed by the Illinois Supreme Court in a decedent’s estate case when an 
alleged child sought recovery under an equitable adoption theory from the 
estate of a decedent who, theretofore, was a nonparent under law, but who 
had reared the child like a parent for more than 60 years.126  To date, such 
standards have not been generally employed when determining a living 
person’s child support responsibilities as a second (or third) parent.127 
 
 122. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 710 S.E.2d 235, 242 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011); Powers v. 
Wagner, 716 S.E.2d 354, 359 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (purposeful temporary relinquishment is less likely 
inconsistent with parental status than purposeful permanent or long-term relinquishment); Best v. 
Gallup, 715 S.E.2d 597, 601 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (relinquishment of childcare to a nonparent, 
establishing conduct inconsistent with paramount parental status, includes conduct resulting in shared 
childcare between parent and unwed romantic partner); and In re D.I.S., 249 P.3d 775, 777, 779 (Colo. 
2011) (temporary guardianship in paternal aunt and uncle so that mother could address health issues and 
because it was “untenable” for father to care for child; when parents sought to end guardianship, 
guardians needed to give “special weight” to parents’ decisions, meaning only that guardians needed to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that guardianship’s end was not in child’s best interests). 
 123. When second parent status is sought in court by one desiring to childcare over a first parent’s 
objection, federal constitutional interests are less likely to block a court-compelled child support order 
against the petitioner even if the petitioner fails to secure childcare (as children’s best interests guide 
possible childcare orders, but obligor’s best interests do not guide possible support orders). Reduced or 
lost due process interests of unsuccessful childcare petitioners may be like lost due process interests in 
personal jurisdiction when petitioning for relief as an original plaintiff; with childcare requests there may 
come possible child support obligations, as with complaints there may come counterclaims. 
 124. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7641(a) (West 2014) (child support against father may be 
pursued by mother, child, public authority, or any other person furnishing reasonable expenses of 
pregnancy, education or support). 
 125. Typically, once designated or designateable as parents, second parents cannot avoid 
unwanted child support by agreements with the other parents, even with a promise to forego parenting 
time in exchange.  See, e.g., Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 760 (Ind. 2013) (agreements are 
void as against public policy). 
 126. DeHart, 986 N.E.2d at 89-90, 103-05 (alleged child must prove elements by clear and 
convincing evidence, but need not prove an enforceable “contract to adopt”; holding of In re Estate of 
Ford, 82 P.3d 747 (Cal. 2004) adopted, and rejection of less rigorous holding of Wheeling Dollar Sav. & 
Trust Co. v. Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369 (W. Va. 1978), where no showing of an intent to adopt was 
required). 
 127. They have also not been employed where support is sought from a former stepparent.  See, 
e.g., Braun v. Braun, 2012 WL 4563551 at 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (statute did not encompass 
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Some written laws on childcare standing benefitting newly-designated 
second parents, be they de facto, presumed, or otherwise,128 as well as 
comparable common law rulings,129 also permit child support orders to be 
pursued against newly-designated second parents even when the second 
parents do not seek childcare.  Thus, by developing a parent-like 
relationship with,130 or receiving a child into one’s home,131 one can become 
a second parent not only eligible to seek childcare, but also obligated to pay 
support over objection even where there is no longer a shared residence132 
and even when the earlier conduct was never actually envisioned by the 
second parent (or single parent or child) as possibly leading to court-ordered 
child support.  Here, there are fewer constitutional protections for the 
second parent, especially where the second parent was not involved with the 
first parent before, or at the time of, birth.133  For example, in Delaware a 
man134 or woman,135 via statutory de facto parenthood, establishes a parent-
 
stepfather; court sympathizes with child as stepfather helped cause termination of natural father’s 
childcare rights which, per TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-113(1), ended natural father’s future child support 
duties). 
 128. See, e.g., DeBoer, 822 N.W.2d at 733-34, 735 (S.D. 2012) (under Texas law, former 
stepfather may be liable for child support in divorce proceeding where he earlier had stepchild’s name 
changed to his last name on birth certificate, though his declaration of genetic ties was not true, and was 
known to be untrue). 
 129. See, e.g., Chambers v. Chambers, 2005 WL 645220 at 1-2 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2005) (former 
lesbian partner must pay child support as “parent,” though not by statutory definition, where she and 
birth mother pursued artificial insemination and coparented for about 9 years, including after their 
breakup).  Compare A.M.K., 351 Wis.2d at ¶¶ 9 and 9 n.3 (childcare standing in former same sex female 
partner though no statutory authority to order her to pay child support, even where she had agreed to 
share “all expenses” related to childrearing). 
 130. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(a)(4), (b)(6), and (c) (West 2013) (woman or man 
can become de facto parent by, inter alia, establishing a parent-like relationship) and DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 13, § 8-203 (West 2004) (de facto parentage “applies for all purposes, except as otherwise 
specifically provided by other law of this state”). 
 131. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-105(1)(d) (West 2008) (presumed natural father 
includes one who “receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child”) 
and COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-103 (West 1987) (“parent and child relationship extends equally to . 
. . every parent”). 
 132. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-204(a) (West 2000) (“any person legally responsible for 
the support of a child who abandons . . . the child is liable for support of the child”) and WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 14-2-504(a)(v) (West 2003) (a man is presumed the father of a child when the man resided with 
the child and openly held out the child as his own for the first 2 years of the child’s life).  And  see Jason  
M. Merrill, Falling Through the Cracks: Distinguishing Parental Rights From Parental Obligations in 
Cases Involving Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship, 11 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 203, 204-05 
(2008) (opining about when child support obligations should end when parental rights are terminated) 
and M.D.C., 39 So.3d  at 118 (parental support obligation not extinguished when parental rights 
terminated). 
 133. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005) (presumed parentage for 
one who was involved with first parent prebirth, and who helped arrange first parent’s pregnancy, differs 
from presumed parentage of one who only cohabited with first parent after birth and supported child for 
a while out of “kindness”). 
 134. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(b)(6) (West 2013). 
 135. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(a)(4) (West 2013). 
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child relationship, on par, e.g., with an adoptive or birth parent, “for all 
purposes”136 by establishing a “parent-like relationship between the child” 
and himself/herself;137 exercising “parental responsibility for the child;”138 
and acting “in a parental role” so that there arises “a bonded and dependent 
relationship.”139 
There are problems as well when child support arises from precedents 
lacking statutory foundations, meaning smaller chances of notice of possible 
later support duties.140  Yet sex prompting birth usually triggers child 
support obligations for a male biological parent though no possible 
childcare was envisioned, as with failed, or assumed but nonexistent, birth 
control, or sterility.141 
Temporary or permanent child support duties are more likely noticed by 
stepparents as their obligations are guided by statutes that recognize family 
relationships.142  Child support duties for stepparents often exist only as 
long as the stepparents are married to the parents of their stepchildren.143  
But some stepparent support duties are permanent in that they continue even 
after marriage dissolution and even without formal adoption.144  Here, child 
support may be independent of childcare standing and arises whether or not 
the financial obligations were actually envisioned by the marrying parents 
and soon-to-be stepparents.145  The obligations are at times contingent, as 
 
 136. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-203 (West 2004) (“except as otherwise specifically provided by 
other law of this State”). 
 137. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c)(1) (West 2013). 
 138. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c)(2) (West 2013). 
 139. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c)(3) (West 2013). 
 140. See, e.g., R.K.J. v. S.P.K., 77 A.3d 33, 35-36, 42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (man who signed 
voluntary paternity acknowledgment and raised child for six years ordered to pay child support though 
mother was married to another when child was born and a third man was the child’s biological father; 
child support for the man grounded on the doctrine of paternity by estoppel in order to serve child’s best 
interests). 
 141. Thus, when mothers lie about their use of birth control, fathers of children born of sex usually 
must support.  But see Dier v. Peters, 815 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2012) (fraud claim by putative father 
against mother whose false representations about paternity led him to expend monies for child’s benefit 
and to give monies to mother). 
 142. In some states child support obligations might only be able to arise by statute.  See, e.g., Price 
v. Price, 2013 WL 1701814 at 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (“in Tennessee, child support is governed by 
statute.  Thus, any obligation to pay child support must arise from Tennessee’s statutes”). 
 143. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 501(b) (West 1995) (where parents are unable to support, 
a stepparent has duty to provide “a minor child’s minimum needs” only while the marriage continues). 
 144. See, e.g., Duffey v. Duffey, 438 S.E.2d 445, 447 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (per N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 50-13.4(b), stepparent child obligation, though secondary, continues, after marriage dissolution 
where stepparent stood “in loco parentis” and “voluntarily” assumed the obligation of support in writing; 
here, writing was marriage separation agreement) and Gunter v. Gunter, 746 S.E.2d 22, 3 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2013) (husband’s presumed parentage of child born during marriage overridden by stipulation that 
husband was not biological father; yet husband might still be stepparent, per N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
50-13.4(b), obliged to provide postdissolution support). 
 145. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 252A.1 (West 1998) (chapter called “Support of Dependents 
Law”), IOWA CODE ANN. § 252A.2(2) (West 2002) (child defined to include stepchild), and IOWA CODE 
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where they only arise if one or both parents fail to provide support.146  But 
some obligations arise for stepparents, even when there are no showings of 
parental support failures.147 
At times, quasi-stepparents (i.e., cohabitating partners of parents with 
children) have support duties.148  And at times, stepparent support duties are 
only prompted when stepchildren are applicants or recipients of public 
assistance.149  Stepparent support failures sometimes prompt criminal 
sanctions.150  Yet not everywhere in the United States are stepparents liable 
for some form of stepchild support.151 
 
ANN. § 252A.3(1) (West 2011) (“A spouse is liable for the support of the other spouse and any child or 
children under eighteen years of age”). 
 146. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 577-4 (West 1984) (“A stepparent who acts in loco parentis is 
bound to . . . support the stepparent’s stepchild during the residence of the child with the stepparent if the 
legal parents desert the child or are unable to support the child, thereby reducing the child to destitute 
and necessitous circumstances.”) and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 296 (West 1985) (stepparent support duty 
if residence in same household and if “the financial resources” of the parents “are insufficient to provide 
the child with a reasonable subsistence consistent with decency and health”). 
 147. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 108.045(1) (West 2005) (“expenses of the family and the 
education” of stepchildren are “chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife;” however, for a 
stepparent “the obligation shall cease upon entry of a judgment of dissolution”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
25-7-8 (1980) (“stepparent shall maintain his spouse’s children born prior to their marriage and is 
responsible as a parent for their support and education suitable to his circumstances;” natural or adoptive 
parents are not absolved of any obligation of support); and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.205 (West 
2008) (“expenses of the family and the education of the children” chargeable upon the property of 
stepparents). 
 148. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 501(b) (West 1995) (“Where the parents are unable to 
provide a minor child’s minimum needs, a stepparent or a person who cohabits in the relationship of 
husband and wife with the parent of a minor child shall be under a duty to provide those needs.  Such 
duty shall exist only while the child makes residence with such stepparent or person and the marriage or 
cohabitation continues.”) 
 149. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.310 (West 1952) (“in addition to any other liability 
imposed by law,” here stepparent is “legally chargeable with the support . . . in the same manner as a 
biological parent”).  See also N.Y. FAM. LAW § 415 (McKinney 1977) (stepparents are like parents) and 
VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1900 (West 2010) and VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1908 (West 2002) (“custodial 
parent” means “a stepparent . . . who has physical custody of the child and with whom the child resides;” 
custodial parent owes Department for “any payment of public assistance money made . . . for the benefit 
of any dependent child”). 
 150. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 568.040 (West 2011) (“crime of nonsupport” for parental failure 
regarding unemancipated stepchild who the stepparent “is legally obligated to provide for”); NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 28-706(1) (West 2006) (“criminal nonsupport” of minor stepchild where one knows or 
reasonably should know of support obligation). 
 151. In some states only some stepparents have child support duties to their stepchildren.  See, 
e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-217 (West 2009) (“A married person is not bound to support a spouse’s 
children by a former marriage;” but support duty arises if child is received into the family); N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 14-09-09 (West 2007) (stepparent not “bound to maintain the spouse’s dependent children 
. . . unless the child is received into the stepparent’s family.”).  Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 546-
A:1(IV) (2006) (in chapter on Uniform Civil Liability for Support, “child means either a natural or 
adopted child”); before 2006 the statute included “a stepchild,” as recognized in Logan v. Logan, 424 
A.2d 403, 404 (N.H. 1980) and Ruben v. Ruben, 461 A.2d 733, 735 (N.H. 1983) (stepparent duty to 
support stepchild ends upon marriage dissolution). 
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IV.  FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON SECOND PARENT LAWS 
A.  Constraints on Second Parent Childcare 
When confronted with federal constitutional challenges to second parent 
designations in childcare settings,152 courts often summarily dismiss,153 
providing little guidance on when such designations infringe upon superior 
parental rights.  Some existing precedent maintains that there can be no 
third childcare parent when a child already has two parents whose childcare 
interests have not been lost.154  There is also general agreement that superior 
parental rights are more easily overcome when parental control is to be 
shared then when parental control is lost altogether.155  There is precedent 
that when two women agree to jointly raise the child that one will bear 
using the ova of the other, an express waiver of parental rights signed by the 
donor on a preprinted form at a reproductive clinic will not always bar the 
donor from seeking second parent designation.156  Here, unlike most second 
 
 152. Of course there can also be successful state constitutional challenges to attempted second 
parent designations even when federal constitutional challenges fail.  Here, successes may be founded on 
independent state constitutional interpretations of state constitutional provisions employing the same, or 
similar, language found within federal constitutional provisions, or on unique state constitutional 
provisions (i.e., having no federal constitutional counterpart).  See, e.g., Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 
182, 192 (Iowa 1999) (finding “a putative father of a child born [of sexual intercourse] into a marriage 
may have a right to standing to challenge paternity under the Due Process Clause of the Iowa 
Constitution;” no standing where right is waived, as when “the challenge is not a serious and timely 
expression of a meaningful desire to establish parenting responsibility”) and In Interest of J.W.T., 872 
S.W.2d 189, 198 (Tex. 1994) (similar; relying on Texas constitutional “due course of law”).  Compare 
Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1052-53 (Pa. 1999) (evidently no Pennsylvania due process rights for 
unwed biological fathers as they cannot challenge paternity presumption in husbands whose marriages 
are intact).  But see K.E.M., 38 A.3d at 810 (biological father sued for child support for child born to 
married woman cannot defend based on husband’s paternity [by estoppel] unless it serves the child’s 
best interests). 
 153. See, e.g., Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 930-32 (Del. 2011)(simply recognizing that “de facto” 
parent designations differ from nonparty standing, without examining closely the “de facto” parent 
guidelines). 
 154. See, e.g., Bancroft, 19 A.3d at 749-50 (violation of federal due process rights of two fit 
parents if other persons are also designated under law as parents).  Often, the constitutional question 
remains unanswered (and unraised) because courts focus on state public policy favoring only two parents 
for any one child.  When three parents are initially recognized under law, as with a birth mother, a 
husband presumed to be a father, and a third person presumed to be a parent because he or she held out a 
child as his/her own, statutes dictate that courts choose between the two presumed parents.  See, e.g., 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (West 2014) (competing presumptions of natural fatherhood resolved “on 
the facts . . . founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic”), employed in In re Jesusa V., 
85 P.3d 2, 11 (Cal. 2004), and G.D.K. v. State, 92 P.3d 834, 839 (Wyo. 2004) (two conflicting paternity 
presumptions, with choice between fathers based on “best interests” of child).  But see CAL. FAM. CODE 
§ 7612(c) (West 2014) (more than two parents will be recognized if otherwise there is detriment to the 
child). 
 155. See, e.g., Frazier, 295 P.3d at 555 and Rowell at 9. 
 156. See, e.g., T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So.3d 787, 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (reviewing other 
cases). 
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parent settings, there are biological ties between the alleged second parent 
and the child. 
Further, there is recognition that not all sperm donors for children born 
of assisted reproduction are comparable when parentage issues arise.157  
Only some look forward to their own future parentage under law, likely 
making the birth mother more susceptible to a diminishment of her superior 
parental rights which yield to the donor.158  By comparison, for the most 
part all sperm donors for children born of consensual sex are comparable as 
intentions regarding future pregnancies, births, and parentage are irrelevant 
to assessments of legal paternity for childcare and child support purposes.159 
The contours of federal constitutional constraints on second parent 
childcare over first parent objections are otherwise elusive.  But there are 
some relevant, generally recognized, constitutional law principles.  One is 
that not all federal constitutional rights have the same or similar standards 
on waivers/losses.  Consider the explicit federal constitutional jury trial 
rights in criminal160 and civil161 cases.  In criminal cases, district judges 
“must address” personally any defendants wishing to plead guilty or nolo 
contendere about “the right to a jury trial” in order to insure an 
understanding of the right and a voluntary plea.162  In civil cases, assuming 
no prelawsuit waiver of the jury trial right,163 parties must “demand a jury 
 
 157. See Elizabeth E. McDonald, Sperm Donor or Written Father? How Written Agreement 
Statutes are Changing the Way Courts Resolve Legal Parentage Issues in Assisted Reproduction Cases, 
47 FAM. CT. REV. 340, 341 (2009).  
 158. See Id.  
 159. Thus, reasonable and subjective beliefs by copulating men as to the impossibility of 
pregnancy (i.e., beliefs as vasectomies or female birth control) do not eliminate the paternity opportunity 
interests under Lehr, 463 U.S. at 248, or the child support obligations under state law. 
 160. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (applicable in state courts). 
 161. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (not applicable in state courts). 
 162. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(C) and (b)(2), where these rule requisites seemingly are mandated 
by constitutional precedents, including Brady v. U. S., 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
That a guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and discernment 
has long been recognized.  Central to the plea and the foundation for entering judgment 
against the defendant is the defendant’s admission in open court that he committed the acts 
charged in the indictment.  He thus stands as a witness against himself and he is shielded by 
the Fifth Amendment from being compelled to do so–hence the minimum requirement that 
his plea be the voluntary expression of his own choice.  But the plea is more than an 
admission of past conduct; it is the defendant’s consent that judgment of conviction may be 
entered without a trial–a waiver of his right to trial before a jury or a judge.  Waivers of 
constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done 
with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. 
Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. 
 163. Unlike criminal jury trial rights which seemingly are never waiveable prelawsuit, even 
predispute waivers of civil jury trial rights are often sustained.  See, e.g., Integrated Global Concepts, 
Inc. v. j2 Global, Inc., 2013 WL 5692352 at 2 (D. Cal., N.D. 2013) (“Nearly all states, except Georgia 
and California, allow contractual waiver of jury trials.”).  There is a dispute on whether state law 
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trial” by “serving the other parties with a written demand” and “filing the 
demand” with the district court,164 actions usually taken by nonparty 
lawyers.165  While the errors or omissions of lawyers who do not properly 
demand the civil jury trial rights of their clients are often overlooked,166 
lawyer failures do sometimes prompt client waivers when lawyer acts are 
inexcusable167 or unduly prejudice those opposing late jury trial demands.168 
Another principle is that not all federal constitutional rights operate 
similarly for all who possess the rights.  For example, a speaker who 
defames a public figure can only be liable for defamation per First 
Amendment precedents if the speaker acted with actual malice.169  But, a 
speaker who defames a private figure can be liable for defamation without 
acting maliciously.170 
As well, similar rights can operate differently for men and women.  The 
Due Process constitutional interests “of parents in the care, custody, and 
control of their children” born of sex171 are automatically recognized at birth 
 
determines the validity of a predispute civil jury trial waiver in a federal diversity action, where clearly 
the federal jury trial processes are employed when properly demanded.  AMEC Env’t & Infra., Inc. v. 
Spectrum Serv. Group, Inc., 2013 WL 6405811 at 3 (D. Cal., N.D. 2013). 
 164. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b)(1) and (2). 
 165. Comparably, state civil jury trial rights are waived by nonparty lawyers via acts involving 
either in court conduct or court filings.  See, e.g., Ladd v. Watkins & Vinson, 168 S.W. 138, 138 (Ark. 
1914) (lawyer absent from courtroom when judicial inquiry on jury trial demands); Johnson v. Sabben, 
282 N.E.2d 476, 477 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (counsel intentionally did not ask for jury though client had 
directed a jury trial demand be made); and Greene v. City of Chicago, 382 N.E.2d 1205, 1207-09 (Ill. 
1978) (though no party was inconvenienced or prejudiced by late jury trial demand, there is a waiver 
unless “good cause be shown for failing to comply with the statue” on allowing additional time for doing 
any act). 
 166. See, e.g., Hargreaves v. Roxy Theatre, 1 F.R.D. 537, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (as adverse party 
did not suffer prejudice, “the court should not be too prone to deprive a litigant of a trial by jury because 
of an error or omission on the part of the agent of her attorney to whom she has entrusted her case; where 
the act or omission is excusable”), cited by Cataldo v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. 39 F.R.D. 305, 
308 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (inadvertence alone, however, will not excuse a party from a jury trial waiver). 
 167. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 996 (2d Cir. 1973) (untimely jury trial demand 
may only be overlooked with a showing of “cause beyond mere inadvertence”); Daniel Intern. Corp. v. 
Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 916 F.2d 1061, 1064 (5th Cir. 1990) (factors on utilizing discretion to try case 
by jury where jury demand was untimely include whether there will be a disruption in the court’s and 
adverse party’s schedule; prejudice to adverse party; the length of delay in filing the demand; and any 
reason for tardiness); and Todd v. Lutz, 64 F.R.D. 150, 151 (D. Pa., W.D. 1974) (no excuses due to 
negligence, inadvertence, or lack of intent to waive). 
 168. See, e.g., Baker v. Amtrak Corp. 163 F.R.D. 219, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (late demand excused 
because, inter alia, personal injury cases are usually tried by a jury and there was a lack of prejudice to 
the adverse party).  Compare Lum v. Discovery Capital Mgmt., LLC, 625 F.Supp.2d 82, 84 (D. Conn. 
2009) (no undue prejudice); Hirschinger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 884 F.Supp. 317, 320 (D. Ind., S.D. 1994) 
(no “strong and compelling” reason to deny untimely jury request offered without explanation or 
justification); and Synovus Trust Co., N.A. v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 223 F.R.D. 699, 701 (D. Ga., 
M.D. 2004) (any prejudice to opposing party could be minimized). 
 169. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964); see, e.g., Neely v. Wilson, 418 
S.W.3d 52, 61 (Tex. 2013). 
 170. See, e.g., id. 
 171. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (plurality opinion). 
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for all women, but not for all men, who engage in the related sex.172  Certain 
men also need to form a “significant custodial, personal, or financial 
relationship” with the child to attain constitutional protection.173  So women 
and men differ, as do criminal and civil case litigants. 
Given the few precedents and these general principles, which second 
parent childcare laws prompt significant constitutional issues when first 
parents object?  Is a second parent childcare law constitutional when it does 
not require the one and only legal parent actually intend that the alleged 
second parent might become a second parent or act as a second parentas 
when the first parent simply believes the alleged second parent was only 
doing household “chores”?174  Precedents on losses/waivers by biological 
parents of their veto powers over proposed adoptions establish that actual 
intentions to relinquish superior parental rights need not always be found in 
order for parental rights to be ended and for formal adoptions to be 
approved.  In one case, a putative father was not excused from timely 
objecting to a proposed adoption even though he had earlier filed a timely 
registration with the Putative Father Registry, appeared at adoption case 
hearings, filed a paternity case, and reasserted his desire to oppose the 
adoption about three weeks after the time he was supposed to file a written 
objection.175  As well, terminations of all parental childcare interests due to 
parental unfitness (as by abuse or neglect or abandonment) in adoption 
proceedings do not usually require findings of intent to relinquish superior 
parental rights.176 
In one second parent case, a court found that while the first parent need 
not ever actually intend for the second parent to “obtain any legal rights” 
regarding the child, more than the undertaking of household “chores” by the 
 
 172. E.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).   
 173. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262-63.  Certain unwed fathers with such relationships might be foreclosed, 
however, if the mothers were married to other men in states with a conclusive (i.e., irrebuttable) 
presumption of paternity for husbands.  Justice Scalia, writing for four in Michael H., found American 
states were free to give categorical preference to mothers’ husbands.  Michael H., 491 U.S. at 128.  But 
Justice Stevens, in Michael H., “would not foreclose” the possibility of childcare interests for such 
unwed fathers while four other Justices recognized federal constitutional childcare interests in such 
unwed fathers. Id. at 133, 136.  States now vary on whether to give similar categorical preferences to 
husbands.  Supra note 176.  So constitutional childrearing rights operate, at least for now, differently for 
different classes of unwed fathers. 
 174. Wilson, supra note 29 at 485. 
 175. In re Adoption of A.N., 997 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).  See also Matter of 
Baby Boy K., 546 N.W.2d 86, 99-101 (S.D. 1996) (reviewing cases) and In re Adoption of B.W., 889 
N.E.2d 1236, 1236-37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (biological father loses child to adoption over his objection 
as he filed his paternity petition in a court other than the adoption court, though he had registered 
prebirth with the Putative Father Registry). 
 176. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.19b(3)(g) (West 2012) (parental rights may be 
terminated if the parent “without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and 
there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a 
reasonable time”). 
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second parent was required since the statute on presumed second parentage 
demanded receipt of the child into the presumed parent’s home and the 
presumed parent “openly” holding out the child as one’s own “natural 
child” (though there need not be actual natural ties).177  Superior parental 
rights are somewhat safeguarded, as they are only diminished (but not 
wholly lost) where the single parent will (or should) see, and typically aid 
in, the developing parental-like relationship.178  Far more significant 
safeguards of superior parental rights arise when statutes or precedents on, 
e.g., de facto parenthood or presumed parentage, expressly require the 
single parent’s consent or agreement to, or fostering, the developing 
parental-like relationship between nonparent and child.179  Such safeguards 
should be minimally required so as to protect the federal constitutional 
childrearing interests of the single parent.180 
As well, some states afford fewer safeguards for single parents where 
there are not second parents, but where there are nonparents who have 
childcare standing.  For example, in Idaho there can be grandparent 
childcare orders over parental objections where “the child is actually 
residing with a grandparent in a stable relationship.”181  By contrast, in the 
District of Columbia, there can be “third-party custody” as a “de facto 
parent” only with parental “agreement.”182 
Beyond safeguarding superior parental rights by requiring significant 
acquiescence in, and support of, the alleged second parent’s acts, a higher 
burden of proof as to the acts prompting second parentage should also be 
required.183  While preponderance suffices for male sexual acts leading to 
 
 177. S.Y. v. S.B., 134 Cal. Rptr.3d 1, 3, 11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (employing CAL. FAM. CODE § 
7611(d) (West 2014)). 
 178. See, e.g., id., at 14.  
 179. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. § 8-201(c)(1) (West 2013) (de facto parent only with “the support 
and consent of the child’s parent”). 
 180. See, e.g., Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 168-69 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006) (in recognizing 
that “a psychological parent-child relationship” leading to childcare standing must be “strictly limited,” 
the single parent’s consent to or fostering the relationship is “critical,” as only here may “the legal 
parent’s rights to unilaterally sever that relationship” be “necessarily reduced;” the single parent “cannot 
maintain an absolute zone of privacy [around his or her child] if he or she voluntarily invites a third 
party to function as a parent to the child”). 
 181. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717(3) (West 2007). 
 182. D.C. CODE §§ 16-831.01 and 16-831.03 (West 2009). 
 183. The latest Uniform Parentage Act, last amended or revised in 2002 and approved by the 
American Bar Association on February 10, 2003, takes a different approach, seeming to allow presumed 
parentage for one who “for the first two years of the child’s life . . . resided in the same household with 
the child and openly held out the child as his own,” to be established by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5) (2002).  Compare id. at § 608(d) (denial of motion for an 
order for genetic testing must be based on “clear and convincing evidence”). 
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pregnancy,184 it does not suffice for conduct that is more difficult to assess 
and has no reliable scientific test, as with conduct that may be parent-like or 
just chores around the house.185  As well, especially where experts may 
testify, possible first parent child abuse or neglect may be raised, and the de 
facto parent law is unclear, superior parental rights may need to be 
safeguarded by appointment, at state expense, of a lawyer for the first 
parent.186 
B.  Constraints on Second Parent Child Support 
As with second parent childcare in settings outside of parentage by sex 
(actual or presumed), assisted reproduction, or formal adoption, there are no 
significant precedents on the federal constitutional due process constraints 
on second parent child support orders arising from conduct undertaken long 
after birth.  Seemingly, child support obligations for one deemed a parent 
are a bit more difficult on policy as well as constitutional grounds when 
there are already two parents with established support duties and recognized 
childcare interests.187  There sometimes should not be two second parents, 
or three different parents, with child support responsibilities,188 as when 
there is little or no real need for additional support and when a third 
person’s obligation would, or will likely, harm the child or interfere 
significantly with superior parental rights.189 
Yet, with three child support parents, unlike with three childcare 
parents, generally there is less risk of infringing upon the superior parental 
rights of existing parents.  Child support need not be accompanied by 
childcare.  So at times, three child support obligors should be recognized, as 
when the child’s best interests require additional financial assistance and the 
 
 184. Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 574 (1987).  As Justice Brennan, in dissent, observed in 
that case, factual issues as to male genetic ties would usually be similarly determined under either a 
preponderance or beyond a reasonable doubt standard, as long as blood test results are used.  Id. at 586. 
 185. A higher burden of proof also seems appropriate for de facto parenthood for second parents 
in other settings, as when the only recognized legal parent dies with the child and the alleged second 
parent seeks recovery through the child’s estate over, e.g., grandparent objections.  Here there may be 
few witnesses to counter the self-serving testimony of the alleged second parent. 
 186. Compare Lassiter v. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 32-33 (1981) (when right to appointed 
counsel may arise in a parental rights termination proceeding). 
 187. Support duties and childcare interests includes two parents now paying support or eligible to 
be ordered to pay support, and now exercising or eligible to exercise (or seek to exercise) childcare 
responsibilities. 
 188. Sometimes there is not even a second parent for child support purposes.  See, e.g., Karen G. 
v. Thomas G., 972 N.Y.S.2d 608, 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (mother equitably estopped from pursuing 
paternity claim against biological father). 
 189. See, e.g., Juanita A., 930 N.E.2d at 215 (birth mother estopped from pursuing biological 
father for child support where “another father figure is present in the child’s life,” the mother’s husband 
who was in the child’s life, was on the child’s birth certificate, and had raised the child from birth). 
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child will not be harmed.190  For example, one without biological, formal 
adoptive, or assisted reproduction ties who holds out a child of two parents 
as one’s own for a sufficient time191 and in a particular setting (i.e., 
household or residence192) should sometimes be subject to child support 
though there are already two child support parents.193  Child support duties 
for the third person would less likely impact negatively the superior parental 
rights of the two other persons also liable for support than would a 
recognition of childcare opportunities for the third person.194  While child 
support duties for second or third persons do implicate their due process 
property interests, typically these duties can be rationalized as serving 
children’s’ interests and as fair to obligors who knowingly developed 
significant, and typically parental-like, relationships with children.  If 
biological dads can owe child support arising from consensual sex never 
reasonably thought to prompt pregnancy,195 de facto parents can owe child 
support arising from their conscious childrearing over some extended time. 
Whether there are only two parents, or there are three (or more), with 
child support obligations, child support assessments against new parents 
need not be accompanied by judicial recognitions of possible childcare 
interests involving custody, visitation, or the like.  A second (or third) 
parent may be ordered to pay to support a child for whom that parent never 
had, and/or now has, no childcare standing.  Thus, a biological father of a 
child born of sex can have child support obligations though he never 
 
 190. J.R. v. L.R., 902 A.2d 261, 266 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (order of child support 
against both husband and biological father as “reality cannot be ignored” and the minor “is in need of 
support and is legally entitled to it”).  Also see Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 9 n.6 (1981) (finding federal 
statutes require states to seek reimbursement by establishing paternity for children born out of wedlock 
who are receiving governmental benefits, “unless . . . it is against the best interests of the child to do so,” 
citing 42 U.S.C. § 654(4)). 
 191. Compare, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-504(a)(v) (West 2003) (presumed parentage for one 
who holds out child for child’s first two years) with ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(a)(5) (2009) (presumed 
parentage for one who holds out child long enough so that a parent-child like relationship develops). 
 192. Compare, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(5) (Texas 2003) (presumed parentage if 
residing in same household) with COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-105(1)(d) (West 2008) (no same 
household or residence requirement for presumed parent). 
 193. But see Smith, 553 So.2d at 855 (declining to decide whether husband, as legal parent, must 
pay support together with mother and biological father). 
 194. Bancroft, 19 A.3d at 750 (unconstitutional to designate one a “de facto” parent for childcare 
purposes where there are already two existing parents; any extension of “the sacred right of parenthood 
to more than two people dilutes the constitutional rights of the two parents”).  Yet in Louisiana, 
childcare can be ordered for three parents.  See, e.g., T.D., 730 So.3d at 873. 
 195. Biological dads can also owe child support to adult children via orders of retroactive support, 
even when the dads reasonably thought they had settled their obligations in earlier child support cases 
brought by the birth mothers on behalf of the children.  See, e.g., Knapp v. Bayless, 2006 WL 2466597 
at 3, 5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (child and birth mother not in privity when birth mother settled earlier, and 
child’s best interests had not be considered when the settlement prompted the earlier judgment entry). 
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developed a relationship with the child prompting childcare opportunities196 
or though he developed a parent-child relationship, but later abandoned the 
child.197  Similarly, one who attained second parent status for childcare 
purposes, as with de facto parenthood, but later abandons the child, should 
often still be liable for child support.198  But there should generally be no 
involuntary support obligations for one who never attained or sought 
parental childcare status, as with one who was living with a single parent 
and providing support to the single parent’s child out of “kindness.”199 
Because second parent status for child support purposes impacts the 
obligors and families both financially and otherwise “lifelong,”200 a higher 
burden of proof is appropriate.  Though only money may be involved, the 
financial obligation of child support differs significantly from other 
financial obligations arising from court judgments.201  This difference, 
together with the prospect of expert testimony, allegations of child abuse or 
neglect against the second parent as the bases to deny childcare standing, 
 
 196. See, e.g., Still v. Hayman, 794 N.E.2d 751, 757-58 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (overruling a 
biological father’s child support obligation even though the birth mother had told the father that he was 
not the child’s father, fifteen years had passed since the birth of the child, and the biological father’s 
parental opportunity may be barred); N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2004) (rejecting 
biological father’s substantive due process claim, stating “neither the laws of biological reproduction nor 
the Due Process Clause recognize the ‘fairness’ arguments plaintiff raises.  Reproduction and child 
support requirements occur without regard to the male’s wishes or his emotional attachment to his 
offspring.”); and Com. ex rel. Zercher v. Bankert, 405 A.2d 1266, 1269 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) 
(“Generally, matters of support are separate and independent from problems of visitation and custody, 
and ordinarily a support order must be paid regardless of whether the wife is wrongfully denying the 
father’s right to visitation.”).  On the lack of childcare opportunities for certain unwed biological fathers, 
see, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 (federal constitution only compels state to consider a biological father’s 
opinion “of where the child’s best interests lie” provided that he develops “a relationship with his 
offspring” and accepts “some measure of responsibility for the child’s future”). 
 197. See, e.g., H.S., 737 N.W.2d at 745 n.4 (some states allow the continuation of a child support 
obligation past the termination of parental rights). 
 198. See, e.g., State of Kansas/State of Iowa ex rel. Sec’y of Soc. And Rehab. Serv. v. Bohrer, 189 
P.3d 1157, 1157 (Kan. 2008) (where the child of biological father who had undertaken childcare for 
several years now had a permanent guardian [the child’s maternal great-grandmother], the father was 
still responsible for reimbursing the state for funds expended on behalf of child and for future child 
support and medical coverage).  Consider as well a possible child support order against a former lesbian 
partner of a birth mother where the former partner initially, but not later on, assumed a presumed second 
parent status by undertaking both childcare and child support. 
 199. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 670 (recognizing that in In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002), the 
court cautioned that not “every man who begins living with a woman when she is pregnant and 
continues to do so after the child is born necessarily becomes a presumed father of the child”). 
 200. Rivera, 483 U.S. at 584 (“Most of us see parenthood as a lifelong status whose 
responsibilities flow from a wellspring far more profound than legal decree.”) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 201. Id. at 583-84 (“The financial commitment imposed upon a losing defendant in a paternity suit 
is far more onerous and unpredictable than the liability borne by the loser in a typical civil suit.”) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
As well, to help “insure the correctness” of second parent designations leading to child support, other 
procedural protections, via Due Process, may be mandated.  Little, 452 U.S. at 14 (indigent defendants 
have right to government-paid blood grouping tests when sued for child support based on biological ties 
to child). 
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and uncertain laws, may also prompt a right to state-supported counsel for 
indigent alleged second parents subject to possible child support orders.202 
V. CONCLUSION 
Increasingly, American states are recognizing sometime after birth a 
second legal parent for a child then with only a single parent under law.  
Second, parent status can prompt childcare opportunities and/or child 
support obligations.  Such childcare opportunities necessarily diminish the 
superior parental rights of the theretofore single parent.  Such child support 
obligations necessarily deprive the newly-designated second parent of due 
process property interests.  To date, the federal constitutional constraints on 
second parent childcare and child support laws have been largely 
overlooked.  Closer examinations reveal serious federal constitutional 
concerns with at least some current American state childcare and child 
support laws on second parentage. 
 
 202. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32-33 (on when right to appointed counsel may arise for a parent facing 
a parental rights termination proceeding). 
